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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation explores how social ties and shared political values among top 
management teams (TMTs) and directors influence who leaves the firm when it is 
underperforming. It does so in two distinct studies, using data on executive and director 
turnover and performance of S&P 1500 firms between 2000 and 2014.  
The first study examines how individual executives’ ties to the TMT, including 
the CEO independently, affect their likelihood of exit in underperforming firms. I argue 
that greater links to the CEO and the rest of the team—via education, employment, and 
political ties—will decrease executives’ likelihood of exit in underperforming firms by 
increasing their level of integration with other team members. I also suggest that greater 
pay disparity between a given executive and the CEO or the rest of the team will reduce 
this effect by decreasing executives’ identification with their role and perceptions that 
they are valued members of the team. Results generally provide support for these 
arguments and particularly indicate the importance of employment ties and ties to the 
CEO in reducing executive turnover. 
The second study builds on these concepts to explore how these same ties affect 
power contestation within the triad of the CEO, the TMT, and the board in 
underperforming firms. I argue that assigning blame is a social process, such that blame 
for poor performance will fall on whichever member of the triad is most dissimilar, 
increasing their likelihood of exit. I also suggest that the level of structural power of the 
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dissimilar group will reduce this effect by preventing forced turnover. Finally, I argue 
that when dissimilar members take the blame for poor performance, this will result in a 
downward spiral scenario in which forced exit prevents turnaround and leads to poorer 
subsequent performance. Results provide some support for these arguments and indicate 
that ties to the board may be especially important in predicting whether the CEO or other 
members of the TMT exit. They also provide evidence that forced turnover of the CEO, 
but not of the TMT or board, is detrimental to subsequent performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Despite the considerable body of research exploring turnover at the top of 
organizations (Giambatista, Rowe, & Riaz, 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994), one question 
that remains unsettled is how relational dynamics among top organizational members 
affect who leaves the firm. Research seeking to answer this question has typically drawn 
from the upper echelons perspective and related theory on organizational demography 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Pfeffer, 1983) to explore how the demographic or 
experiential composition of the top management team (TMT), which are presumed to 
influence interpersonal attraction and social cohesion among team members, affect 
turnover. Studies have used a variety of demographic and experiential measures to test 
this relationship, including tenure, age, industry or functional experience, and education 
level, but have yielded mixed results. Whereas some have found that diversity along 
some of these dimensions increases turnover (e.g., Ucbasaran, Lockett, Wright, & 
Westhead, 2003; Wagner, Pfeffer, & O'Reilly, 1984), many have found null effects for 
these measures (e.g., Jackson et al., 1991; Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Wiersema & Bantel, 
1993) and some have even found effects in the opposite direction (e.g., Boeker & 
Wiltbank, 2005). 
A careful reading of this literature reveals at least three possible explanations for 
these equivocal findings. First, it may be that the dimensions of TMT composition 
examined in the past are not closely related to the relational dynamics they presumably 
measure. While the practice of using executives’ observable characteristics as proxies 
for unobservable constructs may be just as necessary now as it was when first proposed 
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in Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) seminal work on the upper echelons perspective, there 
are likely observable characteristics other than demographics or broad experience that 
better align with TMT relational dynamics. In particular, research on team processes at 
lower levels of the organization has distinguished between surface-level diversity, which 
relates to demographic characteristics, and deep-level diversity, which relates to 
attitudes, shared experiences, beliefs, and values (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998; Jackson, 
May, & Whitney, 1995; Milliken & Martins, 1996), and suggests that deep-level 
differences are stronger predictors of team cohesion than surface-level differences. 
Building on this idea, upper echelons research would likely benefit by identifying and 
studying characteristics of executives that are more closely linked to deep-level 
comparisons than broad demographics and experience. 
Second, the mixed findings in extant research may indicate that the effects of 
relational factors depend on the context. Importantly, however, scholars have mostly not 
considered how the strategic context influences the relationship between TMT 
composition and turnover. This is a significant oversight, especially given fairly 
consistent findings in research studying the strategic antecedents of turnover (see 
Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Specifically, research from a strategic 
perspective has shown that executive turnover increases during times of poor 
performance or crisis (e.g., Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Wagner et al., 
1984; Walsh, 1988; Walsh & Ellwood, 1991) or when the firm is operating in unstable 
or complex environments (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). It has also shown that turnover of 
top executives (and particularly the CEO) is influenced by agency conditions such as 
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board independence and executive career horizons (Krause & Semadeni, 2014; Laux, 
2008). At the same time, because this work has conceptualized turnover at the level of 
the system rather than the individual level (Wagner et al., 1984), it has tended to study 
whether turnover occurs in a firm without considering which individuals leave the firm. 
In this regard, integrating strategic and relational perspectives may not only help to 
clarify mixed findings associated with the effects of TMT composition (Carpenter, 
2002), but may also inform the strategic perspective by clarifying who is most likely to 
exit when turnover occurs. 
Third, research from a relational perspective has not included directors in 
analyses of turnover at the top of organizations. Yet, research from a strategic 
perspective suggests that the same factors that influence executive turnover may also 
affect director exit (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Semadeni, Cannella, Fraser, & Lee, 2008; 
Srinivasan, 2005). Moreover, based on Finkelstein and colleague’s (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996; Finkelstein et al., 2009) concept of the “supra TMT”, which essentially 
considers boards an extension of the executive team, failing to consider how directors 
play into the relational dynamics at the top of the organization may lead to theory and 
findings that are underspecified. Overall, these issues lead me to question: what 
relational characteristics most influence turnover within an organization’s dominant 
coalition? When are the effects of these characteristics on turnover most evident? And 
how do they simultaneously affect turnover of the CEO, other top executives, and 
outside directors? 
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1.1. GENERAL APPROACH OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation seeks to answer these questions by developing novel theory on 
the effect of internal composition on top organizational member turnover in two distinct 
studies. The theory integrates the notion of deep-level diversity with various concepts 
from the domains of social psychology and sociology, including concepts from the 
identification literature and research on social network ties, to explore how social ties 
and shared values influence turnover at the top of firms. I specifically examine the 
effects of educational and employment ties and shared political values on turnover of top 
organizational members. 
As a starting point for both studies, I argue that the effects of these relational 
factors will be most evident in underperforming firms. This argument follows the social 
identification literature (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Tajfel & Turner, 1985; Turner, 1975, 
1984), which suggests that similarities and differences between individuals become most 
salient under conditions of tension or conflict (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001). Within an 
organization, underperformance represents a high-pressure context that is likely to 
increase conflict between members at the top of the organization as they seek to assign 
blame for the firm’s strategic failings and encounter pressure from shareholders to 
improve the situation. Under these conditions, similarities and differences between top 
decision makers will become more salient. As such, I argue that the relationships 
between social ties as well as shared values and turnover will be more pronounced in 
underperforming firms relative to superior performing firms. 
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Building from that point, the first study seeks to understand how the social ties 
and values shared between individual executives and the CEO or the rest of the team 
affect their likelihood of exit when the firm is performing poorly. The general argument 
is that, while overall turnover levels may rise when the firm is performing poorly, a 
stronger relationship between any given executive and the CEO or the rest of the team 
via social ties and shared values will reduce that executive’s likelihood of departure. 
This is because these links, which I suggest are more representative of deep-level 
similarities than factors examined in the past, will enhance the executive’s sense of 
integration and identification with the CEO and the rest of the team and strengthen his or 
her desire to remain with the firm and improve its performance. The study also considers 
how different types of identification may interact to determine exit outcomes for 
executives in underperforming firms. Specifically, it examines how pay disparity 
influences the effect on exit of social ties and shared values, which are indicative of 
social identification and integration, by altering executives’ perception of themselves as 
valued members of the team and their identification with their role. 
The second study expands on the concepts of the first to examine how these same 
social ties and shared values influence power contests at the top of underperforming 
firms by affecting the relative strength of the relationships between the triad of the CEO, 
the TMT, and the board. I argue that the assignment of blame for poor performance is a 
social process such that the more tightly connected are any two members of the triad, the 
greater the likelihood that members of the dissimilar group will be directly or indirectly 
pushed out of the firm. I also explore how structural power moderates these relationships 
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by affecting the ability of any two groups to force members of the third out of the firm. 
In this way, I consider how relational and structural power may interact to determine 
who leaves the firm when it is performing poorly. In addition, I argue that forced exit is 
likely to lead to a downward spiral scenario as ineffective managers and/or directors are 
retained and those members with perhaps the best likelihood of encouraging turnaround 
leave the firm. 
1.2. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE DISSERTATION 
By exploring how social ties and shared values influence turnover and power 
contests at the top of firms, this dissertation makes a number of contributions to 
management research. The first study extends work on executive turnover by developing 
novel theory and measures of factors that are more closely associated with deep-level 
diversity and that help to clarify the effects of team composition on turnover outcomes 
for individual executives. At the same time, it controls for the measures used in past 
work in order to demonstrate the importance of these indicators of deep-level similarities 
above and beyond the broader demographic and experiential measures. It also 
distinguishes between individuals’ relationship with other team members versus their 
relationship with the CEO, in particular, and how these separately affect the likelihood 
of exit. Finally, by exploring how the performance context of the firm influences how 
these relational factors affect turnover, it provides a greater understanding of the 
interaction between strategic and relational antecedents of executive turnover and when 
relational factors may be most salient. 
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The second study further extends research on executive and director turnover by 
exploring how these same relational factors affect power contests between the CEO, 
TMT, and board in underperforming firms. Despite consistent findings related to the 
direct relationship between poor performance and turnover for each of these individual 
groups (e.g., Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Cowen & Marcel, 2011; Fama, 1980; Puffer & 
Weintrop, 1991; Srinivasan, 2005; Wowak, Hambrick, & Henderson, 2011), research 
has seldom explored simultaneous turnover for these members. By exploring how the 
social links among all members of the firm’s dominant coalition influence power 
contestation, this study develops knowledge regarding which organizational member is 
most likely to exit when a firm is underperforming. 
The dissertation also expands research on turnover by extending the focus from 
CEOs to other organizational members. Although scholars have done much to build our 
understanding of CEO turnover and succession, we still know relatively little about the 
antecedents of turnover for other top executives and members of the board. Additionally, 
while the strategic antecedents of turnover are generally well established, research has 
yielded mixed findings related to the effects of compositional or relational factors. 
Overall, by examining the dynamic relationships between the CEO, TMT, and board in a 
given firm, this dissertation adds insights to the processes leading to exit of a broader 
range of organizational members at the top of the firm. 
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2. STUDY 1 
Executive turnover has strong implications for the future direction and 
performance of firms (Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001; Kesner & Dalton, 1994; Miller, 
1993). As a result, scholars have devoted considerable attention to exploring its 
antecedents. Extant research has particularly emphasized the role of firm performance 
and the environment in predicting executive turnover, generally finding evidence that 
these factors are relevant antecedents (see Finkelstein et al., 2009). However, 
recognizing that organizations are fundamentally relational (Wagner et al., 1984), some 
have also sought to explicate the relational drivers of exit. In general, this work has 
suggested that the composition of the top management team (TMT), as reflected by 
demographic or experience diversity, affects TMT turnover by influencing the relational 
dynamics elsewhere shown to predict turnover outcomes, such as social cohesion, 
integration, and relational conflict (Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Simsek, Veiga, Lubatkin, 
& Dino, 2005; Wagner et al., 1984). Yet, results across studies have been mixed. 
Although some have found that diversity along these dimensions increases turnover 
(e.g., Wagner et al., 1984), others have found null effects (e.g., Jackson et al., 1991; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) and some have even found effects in the opposite direction 
(e.g., Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005).  
This work helps to illustrate that much is still unknown regarding the effect of 
relational factors on executive turnover. In particular, given weak relationships between 
turnover and demographic and experience diversity, we are left to question whether there 
may be other elements of TMT composition that are more relevant to internal dynamics 
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and subsequent turnover outcomes. Further, while scholars have explored strategic and 
relational antecedents separately, little work has attempted to integrate these disparate 
research streams to answer the question of how these factors may interact to predict 
executive turnover. Given evidence that the effects of relational factors largely depend 
on the context (Carpenter, 2002), it is likely that exploring this question may clear up 
some of the mixed findings in extant work. Relatedly, this may also extend past research 
on the strategic antecedents of turnover, which has generally focused on overall TMT 
turnover, to address whether relational factors help to predict which specific individuals 
leave when the firm is underperforming. 
This study builds on these opportunities and seeks to extend work on executive 
turnover by developing and testing theory related to the effect of social ties and shared 
values on executive turnover in underperforming firms. Drawing primarily on theory and 
research from the social network and identification literatures, I explore how education 
ties, employment ties, and shared political values between individual executives and the 
rest of the TMT, including the CEO specifically, influence their likelihood of exit when 
things go poorly. I argue that, while underperformance may increase overall rates of 
turnover, executives with stronger links to the CEO or the rest of the TMT will perceive 
a greater sense of integration and commitment to the team and will be less likely to exit 
than less connected individuals. I also explore how pay disparity moderates these 
relationships by affecting executives’ identification with their role and the CEO as well 
as their perception that they are valued members of the team. Prior to developing these 
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arguments, however, I first provide a brief summary of the research on executive 
turnover as a motivation for exploring the relationships I examine. 
2.1. BACKGROUND 
As previously indicated, extant research examining the antecedents of executive 
turnover has been dominated by studies exploring strategic factors such as firm 
performance, agency conditions, and/or the environment (see Finkelstein et al., 2009). 
This research has consistently demonstrated that turnover of top executives increases 
when a firm is performing poorly (e.g., Wagner et al., 1984; Walsh, 1988; Walsh & 
Ellwood, 1991) or when it is operating in unstable or complex environments (Wiersema 
& Bantel, 1993). Similarly, this work has found that turnover rises above “normal 
levels” within target firms following acquisitions and these effects are intensified for 
firms with a history of poor performance (Walsh, 1988; Walsh & Ellwood, 1991). 
Research has also provided evidence that turnover of top executives, and particularly the 
CEO, depends on factors associated with corporate governance and agency conditions 
within the firm, such as the degree of board independence or executive career horizons 
(Krause & Semadeni, 2014; Laux, 2008). Overall this work suggests that executive 
turnover often represents an adaptation or turnaround strategy intended to help 
struggling firms realign with their competitive environment and that it is dependent on 
the governance of the firm. 
To a more limited extent, scholars have also explored how composition of the 
TMT, as an indicator of team relational dynamics, affect executive turnover. This work 
has generally posited that diversity increases turnover rates within the TMT and the 
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likelihood of individual turnover because it decreases integration and leads to internal 
conflict (Jackson et al., 1991; Wagner et al., 1984; Wiersema & Bird, 1993). To test this 
proposition, scholars have examined broad characteristics associated with executive 
demography or experience, such as age, tenure, industry or functional experience, and 
education level. Yet, results across studies have been mixed. For instance, in a sample of 
Fortune 500 firms, Wagner et al. (1984) found positive relationships between both 
demographic heterogeneity team-level turnover rates as well as individual demographic 
dissimilarity and the likelihood of individual-level exit. By contrast, Boeker and 
Wiltbank (2005) found that greater functional diversity decreased exit in entrepreneurial 
firms. However, the majority of work in this area has found little or no effect of 
demographic and experiential dimensions on turnover of top executives (e.g., Jackson et 
al., 1991; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). 
A review of this work suggests a few possible reasons why scholars have 
struggled to come to any sort of consensus understanding of the relationship between 
team composition and executive turnover. One possible explanation is that past work 
may have been limited by scholars’ use of broad demographic and experiential 
characteristics to proxy for deeper, social processes. In this regard, the distinction 
between surface-level diversity and deep-level diversity from the organizational 
behavior literature (Harrison et al., 1998) may be helpful in developing a clearer 
understanding of the factors that contribute to social dynamics within executive teams. 
This research suggests that surface-level diversity related to demographic characteristics, 
which have largely been the focus of past work, is a much weaker determinant of social 
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dynamics than deep-level diversity, which reflect individuals’ shared experiences, 
beliefs, and values (Harrison et al., 1998; Jackson et al., 1995; Milliken & Martins, 
1996). Thus, while the use of proxies may be necessary to examine these relationships at 
the highest levels of the firm (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), research could greatly benefit 
from the examination of factors that more closely resemble deep-level diversity. 
A second possible explanation for the equivocal findings in extant work is that 
this work has mostly not explored how the relationship between social factors and 
turnover may differ based on the context in which the TMT is operating. This is 
surprising, given consistent evidence regarding the strength of the relationship between 
strategic factors, and especially performance, and turnover (e.g., Wagner et al., 1984; 
Walsh, 1988; Walsh & Ellwood, 1991). Indeed, the strategic context may be critical in 
determining how diversity affects social dynamics (Carpenter, 2002) and, in turn, 
turnover outcomes. 
This idea is reflected in the social identification literature (Ashforth & Mael, 
1989; Tajfel & Turner, 1985; Turner, 1975, 1984), which offers theory to describe the 
way individuals view themselves and others within the social environment. From this 
perspective, much of what people do in a social context is motivated by a desire to fulfill 
intrinsic needs such as maintaining or enhancing a sense of self-esteem, belonging, 
distinctiveness, efficacy, meaning, and/or stability (Lange, Boivie, & Westphal, 2015; 
Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006). These motives lead to 
“psychological grouping” in which individuals classify themselves and others into social 
categories or groups based on salient characteristics of category “members” (Tajfel & 
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Turner, 1985; Turner, 1985). Importantly, however, the characteristics used for these 
grouping processes become most salient under conditions of tension or conflict 
(Ashforth & Johnson, 2001). In this regard, similarities and differences among top 
managers may be most salient when the firm is underperforming, since 
underperformance represents a context in which conflicts are likely to arise. In the 
following section, I build on these ideas to explore how factors that are more closely 
linked to deep-level diversity affects who leaves the firm in the context of 
underperformance. 
2.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
At the top of the organization, underperformance is one situation that may 
increase tension or conflict between TMT members, as both internal and external 
constituents seek to assign blame for the firm’s strategic failings (e.g., Barton & Mercer, 
2005; Boeker, 1992; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991) and pressure boards and executives to 
make changes to improve the situation (e.g., Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Davis & 
Thompson, 1994). At the same time, underperformance (or performance under that of 
competitors) is common enough that it is unlikely to cause mass exit, as would be the 
case under circumstances of extreme poor performance or firm crises such as financial 
reporting failures or bankruptcy (e.g., Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Gomulya & Boeker, 
2014; Semadeni et al., 2008). Further, because forced exit is most likely to occur only in 
severely underperforming firms (Conyon & Florou, 2002), executives likely have at least 
some level of discretion in deciding whether to leave the firm. Thus, while poor 
performance may increase overall levels of turnover (e.g., Wagner et al., 1984; Walsh, 
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1988; Walsh & Ellwood, 1991), who specifically leaves the firm may depend on the 
relationships among executives, as determined by their level of connectedness or 
similarity. 
At the same time, not all similarities and differences are likely to affect team 
dynamics and subsequent turnover equally. Rather, characteristics related to deep-level 
similarities, or shared experiences, beliefs, and values, are likely to have a more 
prominent effect on relational dynamics than demographic or other surface level 
similarities (Harrison et al., 1998; Jackson et al., 1995; Milliken & Martins, 1996). Here, 
I develop theory related to three factors that may be more indicative of deep-level 
similarities for TMT members—education ties, employment ties, and shared political 
values. For each, I describe its relevance to executives, how it relates to deep-level 
similarities, and how it subsequently influences a given executive’s likelihood of leaving 
the firm when it is underperforming. Importantly, I also suggest that these characteristics 
will have an independently meaningful beyond (and controlling for) the effect of 
demographic characteristics. 
2.2.1. Education Tie Strength 
One relevant aspect of executives’ social context that may affect their likelihood 
of turnover in underperforming firms is the strength of their ties to other executives 
through shared university affiliations (i.e., a common alma mater). Indeed, for members 
of the corporate elite, educational credentials are not just a signal of human capital in 
terms of intelligence or skill (e.g., Colombo, Delmastro, & Grilli, 2004; Pennings, Lee, 
& Van Witteloostuijn, 1998), but may also affect their social capital by affecting their 
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relative social standing or membership in social groups (e.g., Belliveau, O'Reilly, & 
Wade, 1996; D'Aveni, 1990; Erkens & Bonner, 2013). From a social identity 
perspective, this is because education ties represent a salient characteristic used for 
psychological grouping, which also increases identification between individuals who 
share them (Mael, 1988; Mael & Ashforth, 1992). That is, because individuals often take 
pride in their alma mater, they are likely to identify with and show favoritism towards 
other alumni. This tendency is likely irrespective of the time that has passed since 
attending the school or the number of other schools attended (e.g., Mael & Ashforth, 
1992). Based on a social networks perspective, this may be because education ties are 
among the most stable forms of social networks (Nguyen, 2012) and affect individuals’ 
social worlds and interpersonal relationships by creating “divides in [their] personal 
environments” (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001: 415). 
In addition, sharing similar backgrounds and personal experiences through 
common university affiliations may be associated with similarities in attitudes, beliefs, 
and value systems as well as a common language (Wiersema & Bird, 1993). For 
instance, alumni of the same school would be familiar with the customs, traditions, or 
other idiosyncratic elements of their alma mater, encouraging greater identification and 
cohesion between these individuals (George & Bettenhausen, 1990; Mael & Ashforth, 
1992). Further, although individuals consider a number of factors when selecting a 
university (Maringe, 2006), particular universities are likely to attract similar, like-
minded individuals who are drawn to the school based on the culture, environment, and 
stated values of the school. In this way, education ties may be reflective of deep-level 
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similarities because of both a selection effect (i.e., individuals selecting into universities 
based on deep-level characteristics) and a treatment effect (i.e., socialization and 
experiences at the institution allow individuals to develop deep-level similarities). In 
either case, these ties would lead to enhanced cohesion and cooperation among 
executives who share them.  
Moreover, these dynamics should be more pronounced for individuals who 
attended the same university during the same period. In part, this is because concurrently 
attending the same university would increase the perception of joint experience, which is 
associated with a common language (Johannisson, 1987) and can enhance social 
identification. Further, concurrent attendance also increases the likelihood that 
individuals would have directly interacted while at the university (e.g., been in the same 
courses, gone to the same social gatherings, etc.). Having attended the university at the 
same time would therefore increases the likelihood that the working relationship came 
from a previous friendship tie, which would increase trust, mutual respect, and shared 
identity between executives (e.g., Chua, Ingram, & Morris, 2008; McGrath & 
Krackhardt, 2003; Rydgren, Sofi, & Hällsten, 2013). 
In turn, during times of underperformance, executives with greater education ties 
to others on the team will be less likely to leave the firm because they will experience 
greater cohesion and lower levels of conflict with the rest of the team (e.g., Friedkin, 
2004; George & Bettenhausen, 1990). Indeed, extant research on the corporate elite has 
found that greater identification between executives increases collaboration and 
leadership effectiveness (e.g., McDonald & Westphal, 2010, 2011) as well as positive 
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perceptions of and involvement in the organization and cooperation with other group 
members (e.g., Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994). Additionally, since education ties 
heighten identification between individuals, executives with greater ties to the rest of the 
team through shared university affiliations may be more committed to the team and more 
willing or likely to remain with the firm to help improve its situation (Withers, Corley, & 
Hillman, 2012). 
Further, education ties between an executive and the CEO may have particularly 
strong effects relative to, and independent of, the ties between the executive and the rest 
of the team. This is because the CEO is typically the most powerful and influential 
member of the managerial team (Smith, Houghton, Hood, & Ryman, 2006). In part, this 
dominance will encourage classical identification (Kelman, 1961) in which executives 
strive to appease or emulate the CEO and subsequently have greater commitment to that 
individual (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). As such, individuals with strong ties to the CEO 
will be more likely to remain in the firm and to support the CEO when things go poorly. 
Additionally, because the CEO may have some direct control over who is blamed and 
ultimately dismissed for poor performance (Boeker, 1992), links to the CEO may be 
particularly important in determining whether an executive leaves the firm when it is 
underperforming. That is, executives may be in a better position to avoid blame or may 
be protected by the CEO, thus retaining their position. 
Of course, ties to the CEO may only protect an executive when the CEO him- or 
herself is not dismissed for poor performance. In this regard, while past work has 
demonstrated a positive relationship between poor performance and CEO turnover, it has 
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also suggested that CEO dismissal is most likely to occur in severely underperforming 
firms and that CEOs are often able to avoid dismissal in circumstances other than 
extreme poor performance or crisis (Boeker, 1992; Conyon & Florou, 2002; Fisman, 
Khurana, Rhodes-Kropf, & Yim, 2014). I therefore argue that, in most cases, CEOs will 
remain even in underperforming firms such that stronger ties to the CEO will decrease 
the likelihood of individual executive turnover. Overall, I posit: 
Hypothesis 1.1: Stronger education ties between an executive and (a) the CEO or 
(b) the rest of the TMT (excluding the CEO) will decrease the likelihood that the 
executive will leave the firm when it is underperforming. 
2.2.2. Employment Tie Strength 
Another factor that may influence executives’ likelihood of leaving the firm 
during times of underperformance is the strength of their ties to the rest of the team via 
common employment histories. Similar to education ties, employment histories not only 
reflect executives’ human capital or expertise (e.g., Harris & Helfat, 1997; Pennings et 
al., 1998), but may also reflect individuals’ social capital and may form the basis for 
their personal networks (Belliveau et al., 1996). Also similar to education ties, common 
company affiliations enhance social identification and increase cohesion among those 
who share them (Hogg & Turner, 1985; Turner, 1984). As stated by Beckman (2006: 
743), “team members with common prior company affiliations have a shared language, 
culture, and narratives”. Employment ties are therefore likely to reflect deep-level 
similarities that will enhance integration and cohesion among executives (Wiersema & 
Bird, 1993) as well as their sense of mutual respect and shared identity (Chua et al., 
2008; McGrath & Krackhardt, 2003; Rydgren et al., 2013). 
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Consistent with the arguments in the previous section, the effects of employment 
ties should also be stronger for those with shared time at a prior employer as compared 
to those who worked for the company at different times. Again, this is because 
executives with shared time at a prior employer are likely to have known each other and 
worked together directly, which would improve the nature and extent of communication, 
integration, and cohesion between them (e.g., Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Wiersema & Bird, 1993). Such ties may also reflect that the current working relationship 
materialized because of a previous friendship tie, which again, is associated with mutual 
respect, trust, and shared identity (e.g., Chua et al., 2008; McGrath & Krackhardt, 2003; 
Rydgren et al., 2013). In addition, executives with contemporaneous employment at a 
prior company would have experienced the same dynamics (e.g., culture, leadership, 
etc.) or strategic events (e.g., mergers, divestitures, etc.), increasing their level of 
identification with each other. Moreover, such shared experiences need not engender 
pride in the prior employer or be positive to encourage identification. Rather, because 
“identification is seen as personally experiencing the successes and failures of the 
[psychological] group” (Ashforth & Mael, 1989: 21, emphasis in original; see also 
Foote, 1951; Tolman, 1943), even shared negative experiences or failures at a previous 
employer would enhance identification and cohesion among individuals. 
Overall, executives with stronger employment ties to the rest of the team will 
identify more and be more committed to the team. When difficulties arise in the firm, 
then, these individuals will be more likely to remain with the firm than less-connected 
executives (Withers et al., 2012). In addition, following the same logic presented in the 
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previous section, these effects are likely to be especially and independently predictive 
for ties to the CEO relative to the rest of the team. Thus, I posit: 
Hypothesis 1.2: Stronger employment ties between an executive and (a) the CEO 
or (b) the rest of the TMT (excluding the CEO) will decrease the likelihood that 
the executive will leave the firm when it is underperforming. 
2.2.3. Shared Political Orientations 
In addition to social ties, the degree of overlap in executives’ political 
orientations is another factor that is likely to influence turnover at the top of 
underperforming firms. In general, political orientations are a major indicator of one’s 
belief systems and core values (see Goren, 2005) and, therefore, represent another deep-
level characteristic that would affect the relationships among group members. Moreover, 
given evidence that executive political ideologies are often reflected in firm strategy and 
decisions (e.g., Chin, Hambrick, & Treviño, 2013; Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, & 
Graffin, 2015), these orientations are likely to come into the workplace and become a 
relevant aspect of executive team dynamics. 
Similar to the other characteristics examined, political affiliations are also a 
relevant factor contributing to psychological group formation and social identification 
(Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Ethier, 1995). They are thus likely to affect the degree of 
cohesion and conflict among executives. For instance, research on political identity 
suggests that affiliates of major political parties tend to psychologically discriminate in 
favor of their own party and against the opposing party (e.g., Duck, Terry, & Hogg, 
1998; Fowler & Kam, 2007; Huddy, 2001). This is true even when individuals perceive 
some differences between their personal political positions and those of the political 
21 
party (e.g., Duck, Hogg, & Terry, 1995). As such, political affiliations are likely to lead 
to increased intragroup cohesion, while simultaneously increasing inter-group conflict 
(see Huddy, 2001; Monroe, Hankin, & Vechten, 2000). 
The tendency for executives’ political orientations to affect team dynamics may 
be even more likely during periods of underperformance, since tensions will already be 
high and similarities and differences in executives’ values will become more evident 
(Harrison et al., 1998). Under these circumstances, executives who lean towards the 
dominant political orientation of the team are likely to experience greater identification 
and have a greater sense of integration with the team than those who do not. In turn, 
these executives would be more committed to the team and more likely to remain with 
the firm. At the same time, based on the same arguments regarding the relative 
importance of ties to the CEO, executives who share political orientations with the CEO 
may also be less likely to leave irrespective of whether those orientations reflect the 
dominant position of the rest of the team. Altogether, then, I posit: 
Hypothesis 1.3: Shared political orientations between an executive and (a) the 
CEO or (b) the rest of the TMT (excluding the CEO) will decrease the likelihood 
that the executive will leave the firm when it is underperforming. 
2.2.4. Moderating Role of Pay Disparity 
To this point, I have argued that stronger social ties and shared values may 
decrease exit for individual executives in underperforming firms by increasing their level 
of integration and social identification with other members of the team. However, other 
contextual factors may also be pertinent in determining whether these ties will reduce an 
executive’s likelihood of exit. In particular, research suggests that multiple forms of 
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identification (i.e., social identification, relational identification, role identification, 
organizational identification) often interact to determine actors’ behavior (e.g., Sluss & 
Ashforth, 2007, 2008). In the context of turnover from underperforming firms, Withers 
et al. (2012) specifically suggested that individuals’ identification with their role may 
compete with their collective identity (i.e., social identity) to determine whether or not 
they leave the firm. Although the authors make this argument for corporate directors, 
because executives and directors are both members of the corporate elite, I suggest that 
this logic should apply equally well to executives. In particular, I argue that an 
executive’s identification with the group and their identification with their role as one of 
the firm’s executives may interact to determine their likelihood of exit. 
In general, role identification reflects the meaning obtained by an individual by 
virtue of maintaining a particular role position (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995; Stryker, 
1980). However, one’s identification with a specific position may vary based on the 
context and whether it fulfills their expectations of the meaning they associate with their 
role. For executives, one factor that may have a particularly important effect on their 
identification with their position is pay disparity between them and other members of the 
team. Within the management literature, pay disparity denotes relative compensation 
either between executives and the CEO, referred to as “CEO pay gap” (e.g., Gnyawali, 
Offstein, & Lau, 2008; Ridge, Hill, & Aime, 2017), or between a given executive and 
the rest of the team (e.g., Fredrickson, Davis-Blake, & Sanders, 2010; Ridge et al., 2017; 
Siegel & Hambrick, 2005). In this way, compensation often becomes the basis for social 
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comparisons and may influence how executives view their position and the meaning 
they derive from being an executive of the firm. 
Executives whose pay is substantially lower than either the CEO or other 
members of the team are likely to experience lower levels of satisfaction and 
identification with their position (Wall & Nolan, 1986, 1987). In part, this is because 
relative pay often reflects power dynamics within the team. Since executives tend to be 
highly ambitious and desire autonomy in their positions (e.g., Harrell & Alpert, 1979; 
Olujide & Badmus, 1998), any factor that reduces their perceptions of power will 
decrease their sense of fulfillment and identification with their role (Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989). Similarly, higher pay disparity may weaken executives’ perceptions that they are 
valued members of the team and thus limit the sense of integration that would come 
from links to other TMT members. When the firm is underperforming, then, even 
executives with links to the rest of the TMT may be less committed to the firm and less 
likely to remain to help improve the situation. I therefore posit: 
Hypothesis 1.4: Greater pay disparity between an executive and (a) the CEO or 
(b) the rest of the TMT will weaken the negative relationship between education 
ties with the CEO or the rest of the team, respectively, and the likelihood that the 
executive will leave the firm when it is underperforming. 
Hypothesis 1.5: Greater pay disparity between an executive and (a) the CEO or 
(b) the rest of the TMT will weaken the negative relationship between 
employment ties with the CEO or the rest of the team, respectively, and the 
likelihood that the executive will leave the firm when it is underperforming. 
Hypothesis 1.6: Greater pay disparity between an executive and (a) the CEO or 
(b) the rest of the TMT will weaken the negative relationship between shared 
political orientations with the CEO or the rest of the team, respectively, and the 
likelihood that the executive will leave the firm when it is underperforming. 
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2.3. METHODS 
2.3.1. Sample and Data Collection 
The sample for this study includes 13,581 executives of 1,475 firms that were 
included on Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 at any point between 2000 and 2014. The 
base sample was drawn from Compustat Executive Compensation (Execucomp) 
database, which contains names, titles, annual compensation data, and demographic 
information for the highest paid executives of S&P 1500 firms since 1992. Executive 
education and employment information were taken from BoardEx database, which 
contains, among other things, education levels attained, degrees completed, and 
comprehensive employment histories for executives and directors of more than 800,000 
major public and private organizations around the globe. To gauge political orientations, 
I used individual political contributions taken from the Center for Responsive Politics 
(CRP; opensecrets.org). CRP is a non-partisan research institute that provides 
summarized political data including all campaign contributions over $200 made by 
individuals to U.S. political candidates since 1989, originally taken from the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) website. Additional firm and industry data were collected 
from Compustat. 
Except for the political data, all data used for the study were drawn from 
databases included on the list of public use datasets approved by Texas A&M 
University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). Additionally, political data taken from 
CRP included only publically available data that are identifiable without expectation of 
privacy. 
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2.3.2. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for the first study is individual executive turnover, 
measured using a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the focal executive left the firm 
within a year of the year the independent and control variables were measured and 0 
otherwise. I assessed turnover within a year in order to grant adequate time for the 
theorized relational dynamics to manifest following underperformance, without 
introducing error from changes in the composition of the TMT between the onset of 
underperformance and the time the executive left the firm. 
For robustness, I also ran models using turnover within two and within three 
years of the focal year. Results related to my hypothesized relationships were consistent 
to those reported below for the two-year window but were not consistent for the three-
year window. These findings seem to validate the concern that an excessive lag between 
the onset of poor performance and observed exit may introduce error, likely because of 
changes in the composition of the TMT. Specifically, the composition of the TMT will 
change over time and who is in the firm immediately preceding a given exit period is 
much more likely to affect turnover during that period than who was in the firm three 
years prior. 
In addition, because Execucomp only lists the highest paid executives within a 
firm in a given year, it is possible that some observed “exits” are the result of the 
executives dropping out of the highest paid group rather than leaving the firm. To 
mitigate this issue, I performed a check for each executive to determine whether he or 
she reappeared as an executive of the given firm in the three years following the first 
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observed exit. In cases where the executive reappeared within three years, I recoded the 
first exit event as 0. Thus, the final turnover variable only takes the value 1 if the focal 
executive left the firm and did not reappear in the firm within three years of the initial 
exit. 
2.3.3. Independent and Moderator Variables 
The major independent variables for this study are education tie strength, 
employment tie strength, and shared political orientations. Each variable was constructed 
using a multi-phase approach and assessed for individual executives relative to the CEO 
as well as individual executives relative to the rest of the TMT (excluding the CEO). 
I assessed education tie strength as the sum or sum of standard scores of two 
indicators of education ties: (a) common alma mater and (b) contemporaneous 
attendance at a common alma mater. To calculate this variable, I used data on prior 
university affiliations and degrees for each individual executive, including the name of 
the university and the year the degree was granted. I then matched university affiliations 
for each executive against the CEO and every other member of the TMT for every firm-
year in the sample. To assess whether a given pair of executives had a common alma 
mater, I created a dummy variable coded 1 if they both received a degree from the same 
school, regardless of the level of the degree (i.e., bachelor’s, master’s, etc.). For 
executive pairs with a common alma mater, I then determined whether the executives 
had shared time at the university by comparing the years their degrees were granted and 
generating a dummy variable coded 1 if the executives received their degrees within the 
same two- or four-year window, based on the type of degree (i.e., bachelor’s degrees 
27 
were assumed to be four-year programs, most masters degrees were assumed to be two-
year programs, etc.). For comparisons against the CEO, I then calculated education tie 
strength (CEO) as the sum of these two dummy variables. As such, this variable not only 
reflects the existence of a tie between an executive and the CEO, but also indicates the 
relative strength of that tie.1 
I followed a similar procedure for comparisons against the TMT, except that 
before taking the standard scores, I created proportional measures by generating 
variables reflecting the number of members of the TMT with whom the focal executive 
had a common alma mater or contemporaneous attendance at a common alma mater, 
respectively, divided by the number of other non-CEO executives on the team. Thus, 
education tie strength (TMT) reflects the sum of standard scores of the proportion of the 
TMT that had a common alma mater with the focal executive and the proportion of the 
TMT that attended a common alma mater at the same time as the focal executive.2 
I similarly assessed employment tie strength as the sum of standard scores of two 
indicators of employment ties: (a) common prior employer and (b) contemporaneous 
employment at a common prior employer. For this variable, I first gathered data on all 
1 As a robustness check, I also ran models separately including these indicators of education ties to the 
CEO as well as the indicators for ties to other members of the TMT. These models also included separate 
indicators for the employment ties to both the CEO and the rest of the TMT, described below. In these 
models, only the indicator for shared alma mater with the CEO remained statistically significant. This 
suggest that shard alma mater with the CEO may be a particularly important link, but also seems to 
support the notion that, beyond just the existence of a link, the strength of the link is relevant in 
determining executive exit. 
2 I also ran models using the simple count of executives with shared alma mater or contemporaneous 
attendance at an alma mater (i.e., rather than the proportion of executives with such a tie). These models 
also included simple counts for the employment ties described below. I found no change in the reported 
effects using these measures. I opted to use the proportional measure because it controls for the size of the 
TMT, allowing for clearer comparisons across firms. 
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prior company affiliations for each executive, including the name of the company as 
well as the executive’s start and end dates. I then matched these affiliations following the 
same procedure used for education ties. As such, employment tie strength (CEO) is the 
sum of standard scores of dummy variables indicating whether the focal executive and 
the CEO had worked for the same prior employer and whether they were employed by 
that company at the same time. Likewise, employment tie strength (TMT) reflects the 
sum of standard scores of the proportion of the TMT that worked for the same prior 
employer as the focal executive and the proportion of the TMT that worked at a prior 
employer at the same time as the focal executive. 
Following previous work (e.g., Chin et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2015; Gupta 
& Wowak, 2017) I evaluated shared political orientations by comparing executives’ 
political orientations with the CEO and other TMT members based on their individual 
political contributions to Republican versus Democratic candidates. Specifically, I 
measured each executive’s political orientation as the amount of money he or she 
provided to republican candidates minus the amount provided to democratic candidates, 
divided by the total money provided to both democratic and republican candidates. This 
variable fell on a range from -1 to 1, where -1 indicates that all contributions were made 
to democratic candidates and 1 indicates that all contributions were made to republican 
candidates. Executives with no contributions to either party were assumed to be 
moderate and given a value of 0. Using this measure, I next created a categorical 
variable indicating whether the executive had political leanings towards the Democratic 
Party (i.e., political orientation less than 0), was a moderate (i.e., political orientation 
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equal to 0), or had political leanings towards the Republican Party (i.e., political 
orientation greater than 0). I then used this variable as the basis for comparisons against 
the CEO. Specifically, I measured shared political orientations (CEO) as a dichotomous 
variable taking the value 1 if the focal executive and the CEO had the same political 
orientation. 
To measure shared political orientations between executives and the rest of the 
TMT, I compared each executive’s political orientations to the average of the rest of the 
team. That is, for each firm-year, I first created a variable containing the average 
political orientation of other TMT members (outside of the focal executive and the 
CEO). Next, I used this variable to create an indicator of the political orientations of the 
rest of the TMT, similar to the individual-level variable described above. I then 
measured shared political orientations (TMT) as a dichotomous variable taking the value 
1 if the focal executive’s orientation was the same as the dominant orientation of the 
TMT.3 
The moderators for this study include measures of relative compensation 
between executives and the CEO as well as the rest of the TMT. Relative compensation 
was evaluated using measures of the pay gap (e.g., Gnyawali et al., 2008; Henderson & 
Fredrickson, 2001). Specifically, pay gap (CEO) is operationalized as the annual 
compensation of the CEO, including salary, bonus, and stock option grants, minus the 
3 As a robustness check, I also created and tested a measure reflecting the proportion of the TMT with the 
same political orientations as the focal executive similar to the education and employment tie variables. 
Results using this measure were unchanged. I chose to retain the dichotomous variable because, unlike the 
tie variables, I am not concerned here with tie strength, but with the predominately held beliefs and values 
of the rest of the team as a whole and whether the focal executive is likely to share those values. 
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annual compensation of the focal executive. Similarly, pay gap (TMT) is measured as the 
executive’s annual compensation subtracted from the average compensation of the rest 
of the executive team (excluding the CEO). Thus, positive values indicate pay below the 
CEO or the average TMT member, respectively, and negative values indicate pay above 
the referent. 
2.3.4. Control Variables 
I also control for a number of variables with potential effects on turnover 
outcomes for executives. At the individual level, I control for executive gender and age. 
Given the relative difficulty women have breaking into the corporate elite (Oakley, 
2000), female executives may place more value on any given position and be generally 
less likely to leave. The age of the executive is likely positively associated with turnover, 
as older executives may leave due to retirement. In addition, to eliminate possible 
confounding effects of executive exit due to death, I dropped all executives from the 
sample who fell out of the sample due to death. 
At the team level, I control for various measures of demographic and experience 
diversity that have been widely examined in past work on executive turnover (Jackson et 
al., 1991; Wagner et al., 1984; Wiersema & Bird, 1993). I assessed demographic 
diversity along three dimensions: age, gender, and ethnicity. Gender and ethnic diversity 
were measured using Blau’s (1977) heterogeneity index (1 − ∑𝑝𝑖
2), where pi equals the
proportion of TMT members in each ith category. Age diversity was assessed using the 
coefficient of variation on age, calculated for each firm-year as the standard deviation of 
the age of all TMT members divided by the average age of all TMT members. I assessed 
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experience diversity along four separate dimensions: education level, firm tenure, tenure 
in the focal firm’s industry, and industry experience diversity (i.e., the number of 
industries in which each executive had experience). Similar to the demographic 
variables, I used Blau’s (1977) index to calculate education level diversity. All other 
experience diversity measures were calculated using the coefficient of variation. 
I also control for a number of firm-level variables, including CEO and TMT exit, 
firm size, and two indicators of firm crises shown to significantly influence turnover of 
executives. I measured CEO exit as a dichotomous variable and TMT exit as the 
proportion of executives (other than the focal executive or the CEO) who left the firm in 
the same one-year period for which I measured the dependent variable. Firm size was 
measured as the natural log of firms’ number of employees in a given year (Henderson 
& Fredrickson, 2001). To account for firm crisis, I created two dummy variables 
respectively indicating whether there were material financial restatements in the firm in 
a given year and whether there were any lawsuits brought against the company in a 
given year (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Boivie, Graffin, & Pollock, 2012; Gomulya & 
Boeker, 2014). I also control for firm performance by splitting the sample on one-year 
lagged, industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA). I provide more description of this 
measure in the analysis section, below. 
Finally, I control for various industry dynamics which have been shown to affect 
turnover of executives (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). I control for 
the level of competition in the industry using the size-weighted industry concentration 
ratio (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). I also control for industry dynamism and munificence 
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following the method outlined by Connelly, Haynes, Tihanyi, Gamache, and Devers 
(2013).4  
2.3.5. Analysis Strategy 
In order to test my hypotheses regarding the effects of social ties and shared 
political values on executive turnover in underperforming firms, I used random effects 
logistic regression and split the sample on performance, measured as one-year lagged, 
industry-adjusted ROA.  I used ROA to assess performance because that is the most 
commonly used measure of firm performance in the management literature and is a good 
indicator of the size-weighted profitability of the firm. Comparing firm ROA to the 
industry average allows me to control for industry effects on profitability. That is, a 
firm’s profitability is at least partially a function of the industry, since different industry 
characteristics affect the cost structure and margins that are obtainable by industry 
participants. What may be low profitability in one industry may be closer to average or 
even high profitability in another. Thus using industry-adjusted ROA allows me to 
provide an objective assessment of firms’ high versus low performance relative to 
similar firms.5 
4 In separate analyses, I also tested models including industry fixed effects. Results were unchanged in 
these models; however, there was significant multicollinearity between industry dummy variables, so I 
excluded them from the reported results.  
5 As robustness checks, I also tested models where I operationalized performance as the two-year average 
of industry-adjusted ROA and where I included continuous interactions with the performance measures 
and the independent and moderator variables rather than splitting the sample. Results of models in which I 
split the sample on the two-year average of industry-adjusted ROA were generally consistent with those 
reported below. In the models using continuous interactions with the performance variables, most of the 
hypothesized variables did not have statistically significant effects. However, these results are also 
consistent with the reported results, since I observe significant effects in both low- and high-performing 
firms. That is, as I describe in the Discussion section, the effects of social ties and shared values on 
executive exit appears not to be dependent on the performance of the firm. 
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Although the Hausman test was significant (χ2=1073.86, p<0.001), I opted to use 
random effects rather than fixed effects models to avoid creating sampling bias. That is, 
fixed effects models require variance in the dependent variable, but not every panel in 
the data experienced an executive departure. Thus, applying fixed effects would have 
removed all panels without a departure prior to performing the analysis, leading to 
possible sampling bias by restricting the analysis to only executive-firm pairs that 
experienced a departure. Random effects are also desirable in this case because they 
provide more efficient estimates of variables with little within-subject variability over 
time (Allison, 2009), which is the case for the independent variables included in this 
study. In all analyses, I also used robust standard errors, clustered on firm, to account for 
common firms across panels.6 
2.4. RESULTS 
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics and correlations for all variables for the 
full sample of firms used in the study. Individual executive exit occurs in 24 percent of 
executive-firm-years. In addition, the average age of an executive across the sampling 
frame is about 52 and only about 8 percent of executives are female. In order to examine 
patterns of turnover more closely, I also ran correlations for the subsamples of under- 
and superior-performing firms, collapsing values to the firm-year level.7 For the 
6 Still, for robustness, I did run fixed effects models and I also tested models using discrete event history 
analysis, in which I estimated effects using a basic logit model with time dummies included. While there 
was some variance in the significance level of the independent variables, results across these models 
generally demonstrated a consistent pattern. Specifically, employment ties and ties to the CEO were 
consistently statistically significant for both low- and high-performing firms regardless of the estimation 
method used, whereas there was much less consistency in the significance of education ties and ties to the 
rest of the TMT. 
7 These tables are not shown, but are available from the author upon request. 
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subsample of underperforming firms, CEO turnover occurs in about 5 percent of firm 
years and the average proportion of non-CEO executives leaving the firm each firm-year 
is 14 percent. For the subsample of superior-performing firms, CEO turnover occurs 
about 3 percent of the time and the average level of non-CEO executive turnover is 11 
percent. These values confirm past research that suggests poor performance leads to 
higher rates of CEO and TMT turnover. At the same time, they seem to support the idea 
that, more often than not, CEOs remain in the firm even when it is underperforming. 
For the most part, correlations appear to be reasonable and do not indicate 
multicollinearity. There are, however, a few variables with relatively higher correlations. 
These include the correlations between employment tie strength with the CEO and with 
the rest of the TMT (0.64) and executive gender and TMT gender diversity is (0.48). The 
high correlation between the gender variables is not surprising, given the small number 
of female executives in the sample. That is, a female executive is likely to be the only 
woman (or one of only a very few women) on the TMT; thus, their presence would 
greatly affect the gender diversity of the overall team. However, the correlation between 
the employment tie variables is intriguing. This correlation may be indicative of the 
small-world effect of employment ties and the tendency of executives to work within the 
same network of individuals when moving between firms (Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003; 
Mills, 1956; Nguyen, 2012). In a way, this also provides some initial support for the 
relative strength of employment ties in affecting the composition of the TMT.  
In spite of these few relatively high correlations, collinearity diagnostics appear 
to be well within reasonable limits. Specifically, after running ordinary least squares 
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models and calculating variance inflation factors (VIFs), the mean VIF was 1.15 and no 
VIF exceeded 1.70. Overall, it appears that multicollinearity is likely not an issue. 
Table 1.2 provides results of the random effects logistic regression analyses. 
Models 1 through 3 provide results for the full sample, Models 4 through 6 present 
results for the subsample of low performing firms, and Models 7 through 9 are for the 
subsample of high performing firms. The first model in each series includes only the 
control variables, the second adds the independent and moderator variables, and the third 
is the fully specified model with all independent and control variables as well as the 
interaction terms. To mitigate potential multicollinearity in the models including 
interactions, I centered all continuous predictors and moderators prior to generating 
interaction terms. In reporting results, I refer primarily to Model 6, the fully specified 
model for firms with ROA below the industry average. In addition, in order to gauge 
effect sizes for statistically significant continuous effects, I calculated the marginal 
effects moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the 
average of the independent variable.  
Hypotheses 1.1a and 1.1b respectively predicted that the strength of the 
education ties between an executive and the CEO and between the executive and the rest 
of the TMT would decrease the likelihood that the executive would leave the firm when 
it was underperforming. However, in Model 6 neither the coefficient for education tie 
strength with the CEO nor for education tie strength with the TMT was statistically 
significant. In addition, the coefficient for education tie strength with the CEO in Model 
9, the full model for high performing firms was negative and statistically significant (-
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0.20, p<0.05). While this coefficient is in the expected direction, the fact that it is 
statistically significant in the sample of high performers but not low performers also runs 
contrary to expectations. Overall, the first set of hypotheses was not supported.  
Hypotheses 1.2a and 1.2b respectively predicted that the strength of the 
employment ties between an executive and the CEO and between an executive and the 
rest of the team would decrease the likelihood of individual exit in underperforming 
firms. The coefficient for employment tie strength with the CEO in Model 6 is negative 
and statistically significant (-0.13, p<0.001). Computing the marginal effects shows that, 
in the subsample of underperforming firms, increasing employment tie strength with the 
CEO from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean 
decreases the likelihood of exit by 52 percent. Similarly, the coefficient for employment 
tie strength with the rest of the TMT was negative and statistically significant (-0.09, 
p<0.01). Here, increasing employment tie strength with rest of the TMT from one 
standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean decreases the 
likelihood the executive would exit by 36 percent. At the same time, the coefficients of 
these variables are also statistically significant and appear to have a greater effect in the 
high performing firms in Model 9. Specifically, in high performing firms, increasing 
employment tie strength with the CEO from one standard deviation below to one 
standard deviation above the mean decreases the likelihood of exit by 97 percent. Also in 
this sample, increasing employment tie strength with rest of the TMT from one standard 
deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean decreases the likelihood the 
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executive would exit by 78 percent. Thus, results support Hypotheses 1.2a and 1.2b but 
also provide evidence that these effects are not unique to underperforming firms.  
Hypotheses 1.3a and 1.3b respectively predicted that shared political orientations 
between an executive and the CEO or the TMT would reduce individual executive exit 
in underperforming firms. The coefficient for shared political orientations with the TMT 
was not significant in either subsample. Thus Hypothesis 1.3b was not supported. 
However, the coefficient for shared political orientations with the CEO was negative and 
statistically significant in both the sample of low performing firms (-0.76, p<0.001) and 
the sample of high performing firms (-1.29, p<0.001). For firms below the average 
industry-adjusted ROA, having shared political orientations with the CEO decreased the 
likelihood of exit by 69 percent. For firms above the average industry-adjusted ROA, 
having shared political orientations with the CEO decreased the likelihood of exit by 122 
percent. Similar to employment ties, then, these results provide support for Hypothesis 
1.3a but also indicate that the effects of shared political orientations are not unique to 
low performing firms. 
The final set of hypotheses related to the moderating influence of relative pay on 
the relationships between tie strength and shared values and individual executive exit in 
underperforming firms. However, none of the coefficients for these interactions were 
significant. Thus, results do not support any of the moderating hypotheses.  
2.5. DISCUSSION 
This study drew on the social networks and social identification literatures to 
develop and test theory focused on how social ties and shared values between individual 
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executives and the CEO as well as the rest of the TMT influences their likelihood of 
turnover when the firm is underperforming. By examining these issues, this study 
provides important contributions to the literature on executive turnover. Below I 
describe a number of these contributions before shifting my attention to some potential 
areas for further developing this line of inquiry. 
2.5.1. Contributions 
Results of my analyses provide evidence that stronger connections to other 
members of the TMT may reduce a given executive’s likelihood of leaving when the 
firm is underperforming. As such, I add insights to research on executive turnover by 
demonstrating that, while poor performance may increase overall levels of turnover, 
stronger ties to the group may reduce a given executive’s likelihood of departure. Also, 
by examining turnover at the level of the individual rather than the firm level, this study 
provides insights into who leaves when the firm is underperforming, rather than simply 
whether, or at what rate executives leave. As such, this study offers a deeper 
understanding of how relational dynamics influence the composition of the TMT. 
At the same time, results indicate that not all connections are equally as 
important in determining who leaves when the firm is underperforming. In particular, I 
consistently find that ties to the CEO have stronger effects than ties to the rest of the 
TMT. This finding confirms past work from the social identification literature that 
suggests that the referent matters in social comparisons (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). In 
particular, in the corporate context, it provides evidence for the focal role of the CEO in 
influencing turnover outcomes of other executives. Further, while results reveal that 
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employment ties and shared political orientations reduce turnover, they suggest that 
education ties do not. As such, results indicate that some ties may be more important 
than others in predicting who leaves the firm. Put another way, it is not just whom 
executives’ know, but how they know them that determines executive departure. 
In addition, I find that these effects are not unique to underperforming firms. In 
fact, in all cases, the ties that reduced turnover in these firms had even stronger effects in 
superior performing firms. This is an intriguing finding and one that holds important 
implications for research on the relationship between TMT composition and turnover. 
Indeed, a key motivation for this study was that past work using broad, surface-level 
characteristics as proxies for internal team dynamics has failed to find consistent results 
regarding their effect on turnover outcomes (e.g., Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Wagner et 
al., 1984; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). By providing evidence that social ties and shared 
values influence executive turnover in both under- and superior-performing firms, 
contribute a better understanding of the compositional elements that most influence team 
dynamics and how they are manifest at the top of the firm. Also, the fact that I find these 
effects even after controlling for various measures of demographic and experience 
diversity illustrates that employment ties and shared political orientations represent 
something beyond what these surface-level characteristics represent. Based on the theory 
I develop, I specifically contribute back to work from organizational behavior (Harrison 
et al., 1998) by identifying compositional elements at the top of the firm that may be 
more reflective of deep-level similarities. 
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Finally, the study extends past work by examining these issues among a much 
larger sample than has been used in the past. Extant research has generally used samples 
of 100 firms or fewer and no study of which I am aware that has explored the 
relationship between TMT composition and turnover has included more than 650 
executives (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Jackson et al., 1991; Wagner et al., 1984; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). By contrast, the sample for this study includes over 13,500 
individual executives of more than 1,400 S&P 1500 firms. As such, it provides more 
generalizable findings regarding how compositional factors affect executive turnover. 
2.5.2. Future Research 
This study also provides a foundation for several potential areas of future 
research. One of these relates to integrating my findings with research on CEO 
succession to explore how changes in the CEO position affect outcomes for connected 
individuals. In particular, given the finding that ties to the CEO have a particularly 
important role in influencing turnover of other executives, future research could expand 
on this study by exploring the question: what happens to connected individuals when the 
CEO leaves? Indeed, one intriguing finding of this study is that the connections I 
examine have consistently stronger effects in superior- relative to underperforming 
firms. One possible explanation for this is that some executives have strong ties to the 
CEO, but when the CEO leaves, these ties would increase rather than decrease the 
likelihood of turnover. So, while I control for CEO turnover and also find evidence that 
CEOs typically remain in the firm even when it is underperforming, future work may 
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benefit from more directly exploring whether connected executives share the same fate 
as the CEO when he or she is dismissed. 
Future work may also expand on this study by exploring these relationships in an 
entrepreneurial context. A close examination of past research on the effect of TMT 
composition on turnover outcomes reveals that at least some of the mixed findings in 
this work have come in studies of new ventures (e.g., Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; 
Ucbasaran et al., 2003). For instance, Boeker and Wiltbank (2005) found that, for new 
ventures, high functional diversity mitigated rather than amplifying the relationship 
between performance and turnover. In a similar way, it may be worthwhile to study 
whether differences, rather than similarities, in the shared backgrounds and values of 
new venture teams reduce turnover when young firms are struggling. Further, it may be 
useful to explore how such ties affect the formation of new venture teams and how the 
composition of entrepreneurial teams changes over time. For example, are shared ties 
and values reflected in founder teams or, understanding the need for diverse thinking to 
successfully innovate, do entrepreneurs go outside of their networks when starting a new 
venture? Also, it may be important to examine how venture capitalists (VCs) play into 
these dynamics. Given VCs tendency to make changes in new venture teams (e.g., Fiet, 
Busenitz, Moesel, & Barney, 1997; Franke, Gruber, Harhoff, & Henkel, 2008), how 
might VCs’ their preferences or network connections influence who is added, or 
removed, from the new venture team? 
In addition, whether for entrepreneurial firms or more established firms, future 
work could build on the findings of this study to examine how deep-level compositional 
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characteristics affect other outcomes, such as firm performance or governance. For 
example, how do social ties, shared values, or other indicators of deep-level similarities 
affect performance outcomes such as profitability, growth, or innovation? Also, how 
might these factors affect governance policies such as compensation, especially once 
these factors are expanded to consider connections to corporate board? Overall, building 
on the theory and findings of this study would provide a wealth of opportunities for 
future research. 
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3. STUDY 2
The literature on interorganizational power highlights situations in which top 
organizational members vie for power and control to realize their own preferences 
(Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Pfeffer, 1981b). Of particular interest to scholars 
researching in this area has been the process of CEO succession. This interest is reflected 
in circulation of power theory (Ocasio, 1994; Ocasio & Kim, 1999), which posits that 
“the CEO’s power is subject to circulation, with contesting political coalitions more 
likely to emerge during periods of poor performance and with increased obsolescence of 
the schemas and strategies used by the CEO” (Ocasio, 1994: 285). Overall, research 
from this perspective has demonstrated that CEOs are often dismissed for poor firm 
performance, but who is selected as the new CEO largely depends on social 
psychological and sociopolitical factors such as the existence of an heir apparent, the 
power and preferences of the board, and the strength of the relationships between the 
board and inside “contenders” (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Shen & Cannella, 2002b, 
2002a; Zajac & Westphal, 1996b). 
Despite the value of this work, one question that still remains unanswered is how 
social psychological and sociopolitical factors affect turnover outcomes of other key 
personnel besides the CEO at the top of underperforming firms. This is a surprising 
oversight, given a consistent positive relationship between poor performance and 
turnover of non-CEO members of the top management team (TMT) as well as members 
of the board (Marcel & Cowen, 2014; Semadeni et al., 2008; Wagner et al., 1984). 
Indeed, while work on power contestation has focused narrowly on changes at the CEO 
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position, any of these organizational members may be held responsible for the strategic 
failings of the firm and are therefore at risk of losing their positions when things go 
poorly. Moreover, who leaves the firm is likely to have significant implications for the 
turnaround potential and future performance of the firm. In this regard, who is blamed 
and ultimately forced out of the firm for poor performance is likely driven by social and 
political processes among the firm’s dominant coalition (e.g., Park & Westphal, 2013). 
Building on these opportunities, this study seeks to integrate concepts from the 
power contestation literature with research on executive and director turnover by 
developing a framework describing turnover at the top of underperforming firms as a 
reflection of the social psychological and sociopolitical dynamics within the triad of the 
CEO, the TMT, and the board. I argue that the assignment of blame for poor 
performance is a sociopolitical process driven by relationships among these members, 
such that stronger links between any two groups will increase the likelihood of turnover 
of members of the opposing group. Specifically, drawing from the social network and 
social identity literatures, I develop theory to describe how education ties, employment 
ties, and shared political values influence the strength of the relationships between the 
CEO, TMT, and board and how these may influence who leaves the firm when it is 
underperforming. I also consider how structural power may moderate these effects by 
influencing any two groups’ ability to force members of the third out of the firm. Finally, 
I take these arguments one step further to explore how tie-driven turnover affects 
subsequent firm performance for underperforming firms and the likelihood of 
turnaround. 
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Before doing so, I first provide a summary of the research examining the link 
between poor performance and executive and director turnover as a foundation for the 
theory I develop. In offering this brief review, I highlight findings pointing to a need for 
a deeper examination of the role of social psychological and sociopolitical processes in 
determining who leaves the firm when it is underperforming. 
3.1. BACKGROUND 
Extant research has demonstrated a consistent positive relationship between poor 
performance and turnover of the CEO (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). 
Scholars have often taken an agency perspective to explain this relationship, arguing that 
it reflects a “settling-up” process (Fama, 1980) whereby the CEO is held responsible and 
ultimately dismissed for the strategic failings of the firm. At the same time, the 
magnitude of this relationship may depend on other contextual factors, particularly the 
nature of the sociopolitical environment. For example, Mobbs (2013) showed that 
powerful inside directors increase the likelihood that poor performance will lead to CEO 
dismissal by providing a credible replacement for the CEO. Conversely, CEOs may use 
various techniques to protect themselves from dismissal, reducing the strength of the 
relationship between poor performance and CEO turnover. For instance, using a network 
embeddedness framework, Flickinger, Wrage, Tuschke, and Bresser (2016) found that 
CEOs with more outside directorships relative to the board chair are less likely to be 
dismissed for poor performance. Similarly, other studies have found that CEOs often 
appoint directors from their own social networks (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2014; 
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Fracassi & Tate, 2012), which may increase these directors’ loyalty to the CEO and 
reduce the likelihood of dismissal. 
Moreover, the performance of the firm may affect turnover outcomes for other 
individuals besides the CEO. Studies have specifically shown that overall levels of TMT 
turnover increase when firms are performing poorly (Boone, Van Olffen, Van 
Witteloostuijn, & De Brabander, 2004; Wagner et al., 1984). Yet, as with CEOs, studies 
have found that there may be both a settling up component as well as a social component 
to this relationship. For instance, Walsh and Ellwood (1991) found that TMT turnover 
immediately following an acquisition was higher when the target firm had a history of 
poor past performance, providing evidence for settling up. At the same time, Boone et al. 
(2004) found that more dissimilar members of the TMT are more likely to exit when 
turnover occurs. Thus, the relationships among executives also come into play when 
determining turnover outcomes for non-CEO executives. 
Studies have similarly demonstrated a negative relationship between poor 
performance and director exit (Boivie et al., 2012); although this work suggests that 
director exit is more likely to be voluntary or based on mutual consent than executive 
turnover (Boivie et al., 2012; Withers et al., 2012). In particular, because directors 
primarily serve on boards to enhance their status (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989), director exit 
following poor performance is more likely driven by a desire to mitigate reputational 
risk (Semadeni et al., 2008; Vafeas, 1999; Yermack, 2004) or from a reduced sense of 
fulfillment from holding the board position (Boivie et al., 2012; Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989). Research also suggests that, even during times of crisis, directors may be less 
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likely to leave when they perceive the crisis is externally caused or when they identify 
strongly with the firm. 
Altogether, while poor performance increases overall levels of turnover of both 
executives and directors, not every member of the organization will leave when the firm 
is underperforming. Further, whether or not any given member leaves is likely to depend 
on social or sociopolitical forces at work within the firm. In the following section, I 
extend this logic to explore how the relationships among the triad of the CEO, TMT, and 
board affect who leaves the firm when it is underperforming. 
3.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Consideration of the CEO, TMT, and board in these situations stems from the 
“supra TMT” construct (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Finkelstein et al., 2009), which 
defines the dominant coalition of the firm as comprising both top executives as well as 
directors. Although this concept has been debated based on potential divergent interests 
between executives and the board and their disparate effects on strategic outcomes 
(Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004), scholarship has been clear that boards 
frequently interact with members of the top executive team and that all members of the 
supra-TMT are involved in power contests (e.g., Ocasio, 1994; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; 
Zajac & Westphal, 1996a). Still, the question remains, what factors are most likely to 
affect the relationships among the members of this triad and how do those ultimately 
affect who leaves the firm when it is underperforming? 
In order to examine relational dynamics at the top of the firm, strategy 
researchers have typically drawn on theory from organizational demography (Hambrick 
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& Mason, 1984; Pfeffer, 1983), arguing that diversity along demographic or broad 
experiential characteristics is likely to affect executive turnover by influencing the level 
of integration, conflict, and cohesion among executives. Yet, findings across studies 
have been mixed with respect to both the direction and significance of these factors (e.g., 
Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Jackson et al., 1991; Wagner et al., 1984; Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1993). 
Meanwhile, research at lower levels of the firm has distinguished between 
surface-level characteristics, such as the demographic proxies examined in the strategy 
literature, and deep-level characteristics such as shared experiences, beliefs, and values 
(Harrison et al., 1998). This work has found that deep-level similarities are best 
developed through meaningful interactions and that they have a stronger and more 
enduring effect on individual relationships (Harrison et al., 1998; Milliken & Martins, 
1996). Within a corporate elite context, Jackson et al. (1991) hinted at some 
characteristics that may be reflective of deep-level similarities, including alma mater, 
military experience, and career experience. I build on this work to examine how social 
ties and shared values among the triad of the CEO, TMT, and board affect turnover 
outcomes for these organizational members. Specifically, drawing from the literatures on 
social networks and social identification, I explore how elite education and employment 
ties, which may provide a basis for developing deep-level similarities, as well as shared 
political orientations, as an indicator of individuals’ beliefs and values, affect turnover 
outcomes for these organizational members. In each case, I describe the relevance of the 
factor to the corporate elite before outlining how it may affect the strength of the 
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relationships among top organizational members and turnover outcomes in 
underperforming firms. 
3.2.1. Elite Education Tie Strength 
Research from a sociological perspective often refers to the corporate elite as a 
close network of powerful individuals reflecting an oligarchy atop the world’s largest 
organizations (Davis et al., 2003; Mills, 1956; Nguyen, 2012; Useem & Karabel, 1986; 
Wiersema & Bird, 1993). In describing this group, Nguyen (2012: 237) observed, “In 
many countries, top executives enjoy an elite education, share membership in prestigious 
social and professional associations, and sit on the boards of large firms. They form a 
tight-knit circle.” Reflected in this decription is the fact that ties to elite universities often 
underlie the “small-world” of the corporate elite. Indeed, studies have found that elite 
educations often influence advancement to top levels of management as well as 
appointments to corporate boards (Useem & Karabel, 1986; Westphal & Stern, 2006). At 
the same time, not all individuals who rise to the ranks of the corporate elite have elite 
educations. Thus, while these individuals tend to have many similarities, elite affiliations 
may also be a distinguishing factor even among the corporate elite and a form of 
network tie that leads to cliques or factions within this group (Wiersema & Bird, 1993). 
The identification literature provides further evidence that elite education ties 
lead to divisions among this group of individuals. From this perspective, individuals 
often seek affiliations with prestigious groups in order to enhance their self-image (Mael, 
1988). As a result, executives and directors with elite credentials are likely to define 
themselves and others based on those affiliations and will identify more strongly with 
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others who share elite credentials (Aries & Seider, 2007; Mael, 1988). Further, given 
most elite schools demonstrate a bias in admitting individuals from wealthy, well-
connected families (Palmer & Barber, 2001), elite education ties may reflect common 
social class positions and cultural similarities among those who share them (Brown & 
Tannock, 2009; Palmer & Barber, 2001; Wiersema & Bird, 1993). In turn, these 
individuals are more likely to have common experiences and world-views (Aries & 
Seider, 2007; Ostrove & Cole, 2003), which reflect the deep-level similarities examined 
in the organizational behavior literature, and may band together when situations arise 
that make their elite identities more salient (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001). Poor 
performance at the firm is one such context, since it often stimulates the rise of 
contesting political coalitions referenced by Ocasio (1994) and causes executives and 
directors to justify or redirect blame for the firm’s strategic failings (e.g., Barton & 
Mercer, 2005; Boeker, 1992; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991). 
Moreover, these effects are likely to be stronger for those who attended the same 
elite university, especially at the same time. This is because alumni from the same alma 
mater often have a shared language and a greater sense of shared experiences, increasing 
identification between them (Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Wiersema & Bird, 1993). In 
addition, having concurrently attended the same alma mater may indicate that the current 
working relationship was formed based on a previous friendship tie, which would further 
increase trust, cohesion, and shared identity between individuals (e.g., Chua et al., 2008; 
McGrath & Krackhardt, 2003; Rydgren et al., 2013). 
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Extending this logic, elite education ties may be a particularly strong determinant 
of the outcome of power contests within underperforming firms. In particular, when the 
firm is performing poorly, those with shared elite education backgrounds are likely to 
close ranks and protect each other from dismissal. Past work has provided some initial 
support for this idea, finding that CEOs with ties to the board through elite educational 
affiliations are less likely to be dismissed for poor performance (Nguyen, 2012). 
Similarly, I argue that stronger elite education ties between the CEO and the TMT, or 
between the TMT and the board, will affect turnover outcomes for these members when 
the firm is underperforming. 
Beyond preventing turnover, though, I suggest that stronger shared ties between 
any two members of the CEO-TMT-board triad will increase the likelihood that 
members of the less-connected group will leave the underperforming firm. This is 
because, in addition to increasing identification and integration between in-group 
members, these social comparisons will also naturally lead to discrimination against out-
group members (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg & Turner, 1985; Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 
1984). At the top of the firm, such discrimination is likely to manifest as linked members 
seek to shift the blame to members of the opposing group. Given past work 
demonstrating that status affects who is blamed for poor performance (Park & Westphal, 
2013), those with elite education backgrounds are more likely to be successful in 
deflecting blame to those without elite backgrounds. Thus, elite education ties may 
increase the ability of linked members to be successful in deflecting blame away from 
themselves and pushing members of the opposing group out of the firm. 
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Additionally, these effects may be the result of either direct power plays or 
indirect social discrimination. For example, stronger elite ties between the non-CEO 
executives and members of the board may encourage power plays against the CEO in 
which the TMT and board join together to force the CEO out of the firm and take over 
his or her position (e.g., Mobbs, 2013). Similarly, stronger elite ties between the CEO 
and board may encourage scapegoating of members of the TMT in which these members 
are blamed for poor performance and dismissed in order to protect the CEO from 
dismissal (e.g., Boeker, 1992). Alternatively, turnover of any member of the CEO-TMT-
board triad may be the result of social discrimination, since stronger ties between the 
opposing members would reduce their sense of integration or cohesion and increase 
conflict with others at the top of the firm, encouraging voluntary departure or departure 
based on mutual consent (e.g., Friedkin, 2004; George & Bettenhausen, 1990). 
Altogether, I posit: 
Hypothesis 2.1: Stronger elite education ties between (a) the TMT and the board, 
(b) the CEO and the board, or (c) the CEO and the TMT, respectively, will 
increase the likelihood that CEO, members of the TMT, or members of the board 
leave the firm when it is underperforming. 
3.2.2. Employment Tie Strength 
Employment backgrounds are another form of social tie that often underlie the 
small-world effect of the corporate elite. As observed by Mills (1956: 294), the corporate 
elite “often seem to know one another, seem quite naturally to work together, and share 
many organizations in common.” As with elite education credentials, however, not all 
individuals at the top of a given firm will have ties to the same organizations. 
Employment ties therefore represent another salient grouping characteristic that is likely 
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to affect the formation of separate factions among top organizational members when the 
firm is underperforming. 
Individuals with ties to common prior employers are likely to band together 
when confronted by poor performance for many of the same reasons as those with 
common ties to elite universities. In particular, having worked for the same prior 
employer increases individuals’ sense deep-level similarities in terms of shared 
language, vision, culture, and narratives (Beckman, 2006; Johannisson, 1987; Nahapiet 
& Ghoshal, 1998), which subsequently encourages cohesion and identification among 
them. At the same time, shared narratives need not be positive (as is likely for elite 
education ties) to lead to these effects. This is because members of the same social group 
identify with each other based on both the successes and failures of the group (Ashforth 
& Mael, 1989; Foote, 1951; Tolman, 1943). Thus, even shared negative experiences or 
failures at a previous employer would enhance identification and cohesion among those 
with common employment backgrounds. Also, similar to education ties, these effects 
would be more pronounced for those who worked for a common employer during the 
same time period. Again, this is because such ties would increase the likelihood of direct 
shared experiences or may reflect a previous friendship tie, both of which would 
enhance trust, mutual respect, and shared identity between individuals (e.g., Chua et al., 
2008; McGrath & Krackhardt, 2003; Rydgren et al., 2013). 
Following the arguments presented above, then, the strength of the employment 
ties between any two members of the CEO-TMT-board triad is likely to affect the 
likelihood of turnover for members of the opposing group. That is, more connected 
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groups are likely to scapegoat the less connected group by attempting to shift blame for 
poor performance onto them. This idea follows previous work that has found that 
powerful CEOs are often successful in displacing blame for poor performance onto their 
weaker subordinates, who are then replaced while the CEO avoids dismissal (Boeker, 
1992). Extending this idea, stronger factions, whether comprising the CEO and board, 
TMT and board, or CEO and TMT, may be better able to shift blame onto members of 
the opposing group and either directly (i.e., through power plays) or indirectly (i.e., 
through social discrimination) push them out of the firm. I therefore posit: 
Hypothesis 2.2: Stronger employment ties between (a) the TMT and the board, 
(b) the CEO and the board, or (c) the CEO and the TMT, respectively, will 
increase the likelihood that CEO, members of the TMT, or members of the board 
leave the firm when it is underperforming. 
3.2.3. Shared Political Orientations 
A factor that may be even more directly linked to deep-level similarities among 
top organizational members is commonality in their political orientations. Research from 
both psychology and the political sciences suggests that individuals’ political 
orientations are one of the strongest indicators of their core values, belief systems, and 
cognitions (Goren, 2005; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & 
Sulloway, 2003). Also, similar to social ties discussed previously, political ideologies are 
a prominent feature of the corporate elite. Indeed, there is mounting evidence across 
strategy and related research that executives’ and directors’ political orientations along 
the liberal-conservative spectrum are reflected in corporate policies and governance 
decisions, such as firm capital structure, risk-taking, and executive compensation (e.g., 
Chin et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2015; Gupta & Wowak, 2017; Hutton, Jiang, & 
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Kumar, 2014, 2015). Yet it is also clear that variance exists in the political orientations 
of executives and directors within firms. Consequently, individuals’ political orientations 
are likely to be another salient factor contributing to the rise of competing factions 
within underperforming firms. 
This argument is supported by a large body of empirical evidence in the 
literatures on both social and political identity (Deaux et al., 1995; Duck et al., 1995; 
Huddy, 2001; Monroe et al., 2000). This work suggests that, because political affiliations 
are collective in nature, shared political affiliations encourage psychological grouping 
and increased identification between party members (Deaux et al., 1995). In turn, shared 
political identities increase both intragroup cohesion and inter-group conflict (see 
Huddy, 2001; Monroe et al., 2000). Further, affiliates of major political parties often 
demonstrate self-serving biases, tending to psychologically discriminate in favor of their 
own party and against the opposing party (e.g., Duck et al., 1998; Fowler & Kam, 2007; 
Huddy, 2001), even when they perceive differences between their personal positions and 
those of the political party (e.g., Duck et al., 1995). Again, however, the strength of these 
tendencies also depends on the salience of one’s political identity (Unsworth & Fielding, 
2014), which increases in contexts of conflict or tension between groups. 
The effect of shared political orientations are thus likely to be the same here as 
for the social ties examined previously. As tension mounts at the top of underperforming 
firms, individuals with common political orientations are likely to close ranks and shift 
blame to those orientation in the opposite direction. Under these circumstances, the two 
members of the CEO-TMT-board triad sharing the strongest, or more dominant political 
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position are likely to be more capable of successfully deflecting blame, directly forcing 
members of the least-connected group out of the firm. Alternatively, differences between 
the more connected groups and the less connected groups may create an undesirable 
work environment for those with opposing views by reducing integration and increases 
conflict between them. Similar to social ties, then, turnover of members of the opposing 
group may be either direct or indirect. Thus, I posit: 
Hypothesis 2.3: Greater shared political orientations between (a) the TMT and 
the board, (b) the CEO and the board, or (c) the CEO and the TMT, respectively, 
will increase the likelihood that CEO, members of the TMT, or members of the 
board leave the firm when it is underperforming. 
3.2.4. Moderating Role of Formal Power 
The arguments I have advanced to this point have related to the role of relational 
power among the triad of the CEO, TMT, and board in determining the outcome of 
contests for power in underperforming firms. This focus follows the long history of work 
on power contestation, which has highlighted the critical role of social and sociopolitical 
factors in these situations (e.g., Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Nguyen, 2012; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996b). At the same time, I also acknowledge that the effect of relational 
power on the assignment of blame and subsequent turnover of any given member of the 
CEO-TMT-board triad is likely to be sensitive to their respective level of formal power. 
To echo Zajac and Westphal (1996b: 70), while social psychological and sociopolitical 
factors may determine different factions’ preferences in power contest situations, “the 
degree to which these preferences are realized may be a function of the balance of 
[formal] power” between these factions. In the present context, I argue that more 
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powerful organizational members will be less likely to be pushed out of the firm, even if 
they are not well connected to other top organizational members. 
I refer to formal power as the various aspects of formal or structural control over 
firm outcomes that enable executives and directors to “exert their will” (e.g., hierarchical 
authority, ownership, expertise, etc.; see Finkelstein, 1992). As previously mentioned, 
extant work has already provided evidence that powerful CEOs are better able to protect 
themselves from dismissal for poor performance than their less powerful counterparts 
(Boeker, 1992; Flickinger et al., 2016). But these effects may also extend to others at the 
top of the organization, since greater power will increase any organizational members’ 
ability to influence outcomes for themselves or others (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1989; Pollock, Fischer, & Wade, 2002). Specifically, greater formal power of any given 
member of the CEO-TMT-board triad will make it more difficult for the other members 
to redirect blame and directly force them out of the firm through power plays. 
In addition, greater structural power will prevent two members of the triad from 
indirectly pushing the third out of the firm by increasing their level of identification with 
their role. Research suggests that members of the corporate elite are highly ambitious 
and often seek for power (e.g., Harrell & Alpert, 1979; Olujide & Badmus, 1998). Thus, 
when their role provides them with a sense of power or control, they are more likely to 
identify with their role and avoid being separated from it (Harrell & Alpert, 1979; 
Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Even when facing social discrimination, then, organizational 
members in positions of power may be less likely to leave the firm. This argument 
follows the identification literature, which suggests that various forms of identification 
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may frequently interact when determining behavior (Sluss & Ashforth, 2007, 2008). 
That is, even when facing relatively lower levels of identification or integration with 
other organizational groups, members of powerful groups will be less likely to leave the 
firm because they will identify more strongly with their position and exert effort to retain 
it. Overall, I posit: 
Hypothesis 2.4: Greater power of the (a) CEO, (b) TMT, or (c) board will 
weaken the positive relationship between turnover and the strength of the elite 
education ties respectively between the TMT and board, CEO and board, or 
CEO and TMT.  
Hypothesis 2.5: Greater power of the (a) CEO, (b) TMT, or (c) board will 
weaken the positive relationship between turnover and the strength of the 
employment ties respectively between the TMT and board, CEO and board, or 
CEO and TMT.  
Hypothesis 2.6: Greater power of the (a) CEO, (b) TMT, or (c) board will 
weaken the positive relationship between turnover and shared political 
orientations respectively between the TMT and board, CEO and board, or CEO 
and TMT.  
3.2.5. Tie-driven Turnover and Subsequent Performance 
Having outlined a framework for understanding who leaves the firm when it is 
underperforming, the next question becomes: how do these turnover outcomes affect the 
firm? A common view in the management literature is that turnover following poor 
performance reflects an adaptation or turnaround strategy intended to help struggling 
firms improve their situation (e.g., Arogyaswamy, Barker, & Yasaiardekani, 1995; 
Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Bibeault, 1982; Kesner & Dalton, 1994). Reflecting this view, 
Barker and Duhaime (1997: 20) observed that “recovery from decline is often facilitated 
by replacing the CEO and other top executives”. According to Bibeault (1982), two 
possible reasons for this are that current executives caused the decline or that they are 
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incapable of handling the problem(s) leading to decline. Similarly, some scholars have 
argued that board turnover following governance failures may reflect punishment of 
ineffective directors (e.g., Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Marcel & Cowen, 2014), such that 
turnover should facilitate recovery. 
At the same time, others have argued that turnover following poor performance 
may often be more symbolic than substantive (Gangloff, Connelly, & Shook, 2016; 
Kesner & Dalton, 1994; Khanna & Poulsen, 1995; Pfeffer, 1981a; Rowe, Cannella, 
Rankin, & Gorman, 2005) and may therefore not affect the change needed to improve 
the situation. Indeed, it is often difficult to determine whether those leaving the firm are 
truly the “villains” or are simply scapegoats arbitrarily dismissed to appease 
shareholders (Khanna & Poulsen, 1995). Moreover, turnover may sometimes lead to 
further decline. As Kesner and Dalton (1994: 705) observe, “some turnover is necessary 
to effect change in the organization, but…too much change can be dysfunctional”. This 
is because, even in turnaround situations, turnover may lead to excessive loss of firm-
specific human capital necessary to effectively address the issues in the firm (Le, Kroll, 
& Walters, 2013; Shen & Cannella, 2002a). 
I argue that who leaves the firm and who remains may be an important predictor 
of the turnaround prospects and subsequent performance of the firm. As suggested in the 
preceding sections, when two members of the CEO-TMT-board triad are successful in 
pushing out members of the opposing group, it is the more dissimilar members who are 
likely to leave and the remaining personnel will be more homogenous in terms of their 
backgrounds and values. In turn, tie-driven turnover may lead to a loss of thought 
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diversity (Fernandez, 2007) that could be necessary to effect change and may therefore 
prevent turnaround, as those with opposing views and perhaps the greatest likelihood of 
encouraging change are pushed out of the firm. 
Further, presuming there is “strength in numbers” at the top of the firm, so that 
more connected individuals would have a greater overall ability to influence the firm, it 
stands to reason that these individuals would be more culpable for the firm’s present 
condition. When these organizational members are also successful in deflecting blame 
and retaining their positions, this will lead to the retention of ineffective managers and 
directors (e.g., Nguyen, 2012). Overall, rather than poor performance encouraging 
dismissal of those who caused or are incapable of addressing the problem(s) in the firm 
(Bibeault, 1982), this situation may result in the retention of those very individuals at the 
expense of others who may be most capable of encouraging change and improving the 
situation. As such, I argue that tie-driven turnover will lead to a downward spiral 
scenario (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988) in which the retention of ineffective managers 
leads to worsening performance. Formally, I posit: 
Hypothesis 2.7: In underperforming firms, tie-driven turnover of (a) the CEO, (b) 
members of the TMT, or (c) members of the board, will be negatively related to 
the subsequent change in firm performance. 
3.3. METHODS 
3.3.1. Sample and Data Collection 
The sample for this study consists of the executive teams and corporate boards of 
13,294 firms that were included on Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 at any point between 
2000 and 2014. Data on CEOs, TMTs, and boards were drawn primarily from 
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Compustat Executive Compensation (Execucomp), BoardEx, and Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) databases. To assess individuals’ political orientations, I used 
their political campaign contributions, taken from the Center for Responsive Politics 
(CRP; opensecrets.org). Other firm and industry data were drawn from Compustat. 
Besides the political data from CRP, all data used for the study were taken from 
databases included on the list of public use datasets approved by Texas A&M 
University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). In addition, CRP is another public use 
dataset that contains only publically available data that are identifiable without 
expectation of privacy. 
3.3.2. Dependent Variables 
Turnover models. The dependent variables for the first group of hypotheses 
include measures of turnover for the CEO, TMT, and board. Given my interest in the 
likelihood of exit rather than the rate of exit for any member of the triad, I 
operationalized each turnover variable dichotomously. Specifically, CEO turnover is 
coded 1 if the CEO left the firm within a year of the year independent and control 
variables are measured. TMT turnover and board turnover are coded 1 if one or more 
members of the TMT or board, respectively, left the firm within a year of the year 
independent and control variables were measured. I assessed turnover within a year in 
order to grant adequate time for the theorized political dynamics to manifest following 
underperformance without introducing error from changes in the composition of the 
TMT or board between the onset of underperformance and the exit period. In assessing 
individual turnover of the CEO and of executives (i.e., as a basis for measuring group 
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turnover), I also followed the same approach outlined in the first study to ensure 
observed exits were not due to dropping out of the highest paid group of executives in 
Execucomp. That is, the CEO or other executives were only counted as having exited if 
they left the firm and did not reappear in the firm within three years of the initial 
observed exit.  
For robustness, I also measured exit within two and three years of the year in 
which independent and control variables were measured. Results based on the two-year 
measure were identical to those presented below. However, several of the supported 
hypotheses lost statistical significance when using the three-year window. Similar to the 
first study, these findings validate the concern that using an excessive lag may introduce 
error from changes in the composition of the TMT and/or board between the onset of 
poor performance and the exit period. That is, the composition of the TMT and board 
changes over time and who is in the firm immediately preceding a given exit period is 
much more likely to affect turnover during that period than who was in the firm three 
years prior. In addition, it is likely that power struggles brought on by underperformance 
would have already played out before three years following the poor performance. Thus, 
retaining the one-year window seems appropriate. 
Performance models. For the second group of hypotheses predicting 
performance, the dependent variable is the change in firm performance following tie-
driven exit. I used return on assets (ROA) to gauge firm performance in each year for 
every firm in the sample. I then measured performance change as the change in ROA 
from the year in which turnover was assessed and the following year. 
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3.3.3. Independent and Moderator Variables 
Turnover models. For my hypotheses predicting exit, independent variables 
include measures of elite education tie strength, employment tie strength, and shared 
political orientations. I used a similar multi-phased approach to assess each variable 
between the CEO and board, CEO and TMT, and TMT and board. In each case, I first 
identified ties between individuals before aggregating to the group level. 
I assessed elite education tie strength as the summed standard scores of the size-
weighted number of ties shared between each dyad, based on three indicators of elite 
education ties: (a) shared elite affiliations, (b) common elite alma mater, and (c) 
contemporaneous attendance at a common alma mater.8 I used the full education 
histories of every individual executive and director in the sample to create this set of 
variables. To identify elite universities, I used the list compiled by Finkelstein (1992), 
which includes all members of the Ivy League as well as top rated undergraduate 
programs, M.B.A. programs, law programs, liberal arts colleges, and the U.S. Military 
and Naval academies. For each firm-year, I then matched individuals across each group 
(i.e., CEO to individual directors, CEO to individual TMT members, and individual 
directors to individual TMT members) on the three indicators. Specifically, to assess 
whether a given pair of individuals had shared elite affiliations, I created a dummy 
variable coded 1 if they both received at least one degree from an elite institution (e.g., 
8 As with the first study, I also tested models separately including the indicator variables for education as 
well as employment ties described here and in the next section. While some of these indicators did have 
significant effects, most did not, and those that did were not consistent across the different dyads (i.e., 
CEO-TMT, CEO-board, and TMT-board). Overall, these results seem to suggest that, when exploring how 
social ties affect turnover at the top of the firm, it is important to consider the strength of a given type of 
tie more than simply the existence of a tie.  
64 
Person A received a degree from Harvard, Person B received a degree from Yale). For 
individuals with shared elite affiliations, I then assessed whether they had a common 
elite alma mater by generating a dummy variable coded 1 if the individuals both 
received a degree from the same elite institution, regardless of the level of the degree 
(e.g., Person A and Person B both received degrees from Harvard = 1). Finally, for those 
with a common elite alma mater, I determined whether they had contemporaneous 
attendance at that alma mater by comparing the years their degrees were granted and 
generating a dummy variable coded 1 if the they received the same type of degree during 
the same period (e.g., Person A received a bachelors’ degree from Yale in 1978, Person 
B received a bachelor’s degree from Yale in 1979 = 1). For this indicator, I evaluated 
whether the individuals attended the university at the same time based on the assumed 
time to complete each type of degree (i.e., most masters degrees were assumed to be 
two-year programs, bachelor’s degrees were assumed to be four-year programs, etc.). 
For each indicator, I then created count variables reflecting the number of each 
type of tie that existed between each dyad and then weighted these by the number of 
individuals included in the comparison.9 For the CEO-board dyad, if the CEO had a 
degree from an elite institution, I generated separate count variables for the number of 
directors who (a) also had a degree from an elite institution, (b) had a degree from the 
same elite institution as the CEO, and (c) had contemporaneous attendance with the 
CEO at the same elite institution. I then divided each of these values by the number of 
9 Similar to the first study, I also tested models using the sum standard scores of the simple counts of 
education and employment ties for each dyad, rather than size-weighted counts. Results were unchanged 
when operationalizing tie strength in this way. Here again, I decided to use the size-weighted scores 
because this allowed for better comparisons across firms in interpreting effects.  
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directors on the board plus one (the CEO) in order to generate a size-weighted count that 
would allow for better comparisons across firms. For instance, a CEO who is connected 
to two out of five outside directors would be in a stronger position than one who is 
connected to two out of nine outside directors. Finally, I calculated elite education tie 
strength (CEO to board) as the summed standard score of these size-weighted count 
variables. By summing these variables in this way, this measure not only allows me to 
assess the (size-weighted) number of ties that exist between the CEO and the board, but 
also provides an indication of the strength of those ties. I followed the same procedure to 
calculate elite education tie strength (CEO to TMT) as well as elite education tie 
strength (TMT to board), weighting each variable based on the number of individuals 
included across the respective dyad. 
Like education tie strength, I assessed employment tie strength as the summed 
standard scores of the size-weighted number of ties shared between each dyad, based on 
two indicators of elite education ties: (a) common prior employer and (b) 
contemporaneous employment at a common prior employer. To create this set of 
variables, I used the full employment histories on all of the executives and directors in 
the sample, including the name of every company for which they had worked prior to the 
current company as well as their start and end dates. I then matched these affiliations 
following the same procedure used for elite education ties. Thus, employment tie 
strength (CEO to board) is the sum of standard scores of the size-weighted counts of 
directors with one or more common prior employers with the CEO and directors with 
contemporaneous employment at one or more common prior employers. Similarly, 
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employment tie strength (CEO to TMT) and employment tie strength (TMT to board) 
reflect the size-weighted counts of pairs across the respective dyads with one or more 
common prior employer or contemporaneous employment at a common prior employer. 
I followed a similar procedure to evaluate shared political orientations across 
dyads. But before comparing political orientations, I first assessed political orientations 
for all executives and directors in the sample based on their individual political 
contributions. To do so, I followed previous work (e.g., Chin et al., 2013; Christensen et 
al., 2015; Gupta & Wowak, 2017) and measured individuals’ political orientations as the 
amount of money provided to republican candidates minus the amount provided to 
democratic candidates, divided by the total money provided to both democratic and 
republican candidates. This variable fell on a range from -1 to 1, where -1 indicates that 
all contributions were made to democratic candidates and 1 indicates that all 
contributions were made to republican candidates. Executives with no contributions to 
either party were assumed to be moderate and given a value of 0. After creating this 
measure, I then created a categorical variable indicating whether the executive had 
political orientations towards the Democratic Party (i.e., political orientation less than 0), 
was a moderate (i.e., political orientation equal to 0), or had political orientations 
towards the Republican Party (i.e., political orientation greater than 0). 
I then used this variable for comparisons across each dyad. That is, for each 
dyad, I generated count variables reflecting the number of individuals with shared 
political orientations. As with the other independent variables, I also weighted these by 
the number of individuals in the comparison groups. Thus, shared political orientations 
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(CEO to board) is the number of outside directors with the same political orientations as 
the CEO, divided by the number of outside directors on the board plus one (for the 
CEO). Similarly, shared political orientations (CEO the TMT) and shared political 
orientations (TMT to board) reflect the size-weighted number of pairs with across each 
respective dyad with shared political orientations. 
Performance models. Independent variables for the performance-related 
hypotheses include measures of tie-driven exit for the CEO, the TMT, and the board. 
These variables were measured as dichotomous variables coded 1 if both of the 
following criteria were met: (a) there was turnover within the focal group and (b) the 
opposing dyad had the strongest of the three links. Thus, calculating this variable 
required that I evaluate the relative strength of the ties between the CEO and board, CEO 
and TMT, and TMT and board. To do this, I compared the strength of each of the three 
forms of ties—elite education, employment, and political—and created a variable to 
indicate which dyad had the dominant tie in each category. I then created separate 
dummy variables for each dyad taking the value 1 if the given dyad had the dominant tie 
in two or more of the three categories. These variables were then used as a proxy for 
criteria (b), above. Then, in order to satisfy criteria (a), I only examined the effects of 
this variable using the subsamples of panels in which there was turnover in the focal 
group. 
Thus, tie-driven CEO exit is a dichotomous variable taking the value 1 if the 
TMT and the board had dominant ties in two or more of the three categories in a given 
year and this effect was tested in the subsample of panels in which the CEO exited 
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within a year of the year ties were assessed. Likewise, tie-driven TMT exit and tie-driven 
board exit are dichotomous variables taking the value 1 if the CEO and the board or 
CEO and the TMT, respectively, had the dominant tie in a given year and these effects 
were tested on the subsamples of panels in which one or more members of the TMT or 
board exited in that same year. 
Moderators. Moderators for this study include measures of CEO, TMT, and 
board power. Following past work, CEO power was measured as the sum of standard 
scores of four common indicators of power: (a) whether the CEO was also the chair of 
the board, (b) his or her number of official titles, (c) the percentage of equity ownership 
by the CEO in the firm in a given year, and (d) the number of certifications he or she 
held (e.g., CPA, CFA, etc.) (e.g., Dunn, 2004; Pollock et al., 2002; Zhu & Chen, 2015). 
For consistency, TMT power and board power were measured using these same 
indicators at the individual level and then aggregated to the group level by taking the 
mean score for each executive on the TMT or each director on the board, respectively. 
3.3.4. Control Variables 
I also include a number of controls at different levels of analysis across the 
various models tested. For models predicting CEO turnover and performance following 
CEO turnover, I control for several individual-level characteristics that may be related to 
the likelihood that the CEO would leave the firm. These include the age and gender of 
the CEO as well as the CEO’s tenure. In addition, I control for board independence using 
the proportion of outsiders on the board, since this ratio may affect the likelihood that 
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the CEO would be dismissed for poor firm performance (Kaplan & Minton, 2012; Laux, 
2008). 
For models predicting TMT turnover or performance following TMT turnover, I 
control for various TMT-level measures of demographic and experience diversity that 
have been widely examined in past work on executive turnover (Jackson et al., 1991; 
Wagner et al., 1984; Wiersema & Bird, 1993). I assessed demographic diversity along 
three dimensions: age, gender, and ethnicity. Gender and ethnic diversity were measured 
using Blau’s (1977) heterogeneity index (1 − ∑𝑝𝑖
2), where pi equals the proportion of
TMT members in each ith category. Age diversity was assessed using the coefficient of 
variation on age, calculated for each firm-year as the standard deviation of the age of all 
TMT members divided by the average age of all TMT members. I assessed experience 
diversity along four separate dimensions: education level, firm tenure, tenure in the focal 
firm’s industry, and industry experience diversity (i.e., the number of industries in which 
each executive had experience). As with the demographic variables, I used Blau’s (1977) 
index to calculate education level diversity. All other experience diversity measures 
were calculated using the coefficient of variation. 
I control for the same demographic and experience measures used in the TMT 
models, measured at the board level, in models predicting board turnover or performance 
following board turnover. That is, I control for age, gender, and ethnic diversity of the 
board using the same methods described above. Likewise, I control for experience 
diversity of the board along education level, board tenure, tenure in the focal firm’s 
industry, and industry experience. 
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Across all models, I also control for various firm and industry-level factors that 
may be related to exit by top organizational members. These include the same variables 
that were used as controls in the first study. Specifically, at the firm level, I control for 
measures of firm size, firm performance, financial restatements, and litigation against 
the firm using the same methods described in the first study. In addition, I control for 
turnover of the opposing members across each model. Also, given previous work on the 
relationship between successor type and subsequent performance (Shen & Cannella, 
2002a), I ran separate models specifically controlling for inside versus outside CEO 
succession. Results from these models were identical to those presented below and, in 
fact, the succession variables were not statistically significant. Thus, for parsimony, I do 
not include them in the reported results. At the industry level, I control for industry 
concentration, dynamism, and munificence, also measured the same way here as 
described in the first study. 
3.3.5. Analysis Strategy 
I used random effects logistic regression to examine turnover separately for the 
CEO, TMT, and board. To account for the full range of ties within each firm, I included 
tie strength for every dyad in all turnover models. Thus, while I focus only on the tie 
strength between a single dyad in interpreting results, I also control for the tie strength of 
the opposing dyads. To examine simultaneous exit, I control for exit of the two non-
focal members across all models. Also, similar to the first study, I split the sample on 
one year lagged, industry-adjusted ROA to examine the effects in poor performing 
relative to superior performing firms. The reasons for using this measure of performance 
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are the same here as for the first study. In all analyses, I used robust standard errors, 
clustered on firm. 
Although the Hausman test for each set of models was statistically significant 
(CEO turnover models: χ2=510.94, p<0.001; TMT turnover models: χ2=260.80, p<0.001; 
board turnover models: χ2=322.21, p<0.001), I opted to use random effects rather than 
fixed effects models to avoid creating sampling bias. That is, fixed effects models 
require variance in the dependent variable, but not every panel in the data experienced 
executive or director departure. Thus, applying fixed effects would have removed all 
panels without a departure prior to performing the analysis, leading to possible sampling 
bias by restricting the analysis to only firms that experienced a departure of any given 
member. Random effects are also desirable in this case because they provide more 
efficient estimates of variables with little within-subject variability over time (Allison, 
2009), which is the case for the independent variables within firms for this study.10  
To test the effects of tie-driven exit on subsequent performance, I estimated 
random effects models predicting firm performance following tie-driven exit of each 
member. As mentioned previously, for each type of turnover, I examined the effect of a 
dominant tie of the opposing dyad only in panels in which turnover occurred within the 
focal group. This allowed me to compare subsequent performance across firms that had 
experienced turnover of the top member of interest and avoid comparisons against firms 
10 As robustness checks, I also ran fixed effects models and models using discrete event history analysis, 
similar to the first study. Again, while there was variance in the significance level of the independent 
variables across these models, a consistent pattern did emerge. Here, effects for political ties and ties to the 
board (i.e. for the CEO or TMT) were mostly consistent across models, but there was much less 
consistency in the other types of ties. 
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where turnover did not occur in the focal group. Also, in each case, the Hausman test 
was not statistically significant, suggesting that random effects models provided more 
efficient estimates and were the preferred estimation method. 
3.4. RESULTS 
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in 
the study. Turnover of the CEO, TMT, and board respectively occurs in 11 percent, 63 
percent, and 66 percent of firm-years in the sample. The average age of a CEO in the 
sample is 56 and a female is the CEO in only about 2 percent of firm-years. The average 
CEO in the sample has been in the firm for 15 years. Also, on average, 83 percent of the 
board is comprised of outsiders. In general, TMTs and boards appear to be 
demographically similar, given relatively small measures of demographic diversity and 
small standard deviations on these measures across the sample. However, TMTs and 
boards in the sample appear to have greater diversity and variance along experiential 
characteristics, especially company and industry tenure. In addition, there appear to be 
no abnormally high correlations and collinearity diagnostics are all within reasonable 
levels. Specifically, the mean level for variance inflation factors (VIF) across all models 
is 1.18 and no VIF exceeds 2.0, indicating the multicollinearity is likely not an issue. 
3.4.1. Turnover Models 
CEO turnover. Results of models predicting CEO turnover are provided in Table 
2.2. The table provides estimates for the full sample of firms (Models 1 to 3) as well as 
for the subsamples of underperforming (Models 4 to 6) and superior performing firms 
(Models 7 to 9). For each group of firms, the first model includes only the controls, the 
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second adds the independent variables, and the final model is the fully specified model 
including the interactions terms. I interpret effect sizes for statistically significant 
coefficients by calculating the marginal effects moving from one standard deviation 
below to one standard deviation above the mean of the independent variable. 
Hypotheses 2.1a, 2.2a, and 2.3a respectively predict that the strength of the elite 
education ties, employment ties, and shared political orientations between the TMT and 
board will increase the likelihood that the CEO exits the firm when it is 
underperforming. The coefficient for elite education tie strength between the TMT and 
the board is positive and marginally statistically significant in Model 6 (0.05, p<0.10). 
This coefficient indicates that moving from one standard deviation below to one 
standard deviation above the mean increases the likelihood of CEO exit by 24 percent. 
Moreover, the corresponding coefficient in Model 9 for superior performing firms is not 
statistically significant, supporting the notion that these effects are most likely in 
underperforming firms. Overall, these results provide marginal support for Hypothesis 
2.1a. 
Similarly, the coefficient for employment tie strength between the TMT and 
board is positive and marginally statistically significant in Model 6 (0.06, p<0.10) and 
indicates that, for underperforming firms, moving from one standard deviation below to 
one standard deviation above the mean of employment tie strength increases the 
likelihood of CEO exit by 23 percent. Interestingly, however, the corresponding 
coefficient for superior performing firms in Model 9 is also positive and statistically 
significant (0.09, p<0.05). This coefficient indicates that, for superior performing firms, 
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a similar change in employment tie strength between the TMT and board increases the 
likelihood of CEO exit by 36 percent. This finding suggests that the effects of TMT to 
board employment tie strength on CEO exit is not restricted to, and in fact appears to be 
greater, in superior performing relative to underperforming firms. Still, results generally 
provide support for Hypothesis 2.2a. 
By contrast, the coefficient for the effect of shared political orientations between 
the TMT and board on CEO exit is negative and statistically significant (-0.74, p<0.05). 
Contrary to expectation, this coefficient suggests that greater shared political orientations 
between the TMT and the board reduces the likelihood of CEO exit. Specifically, in the 
sample of underperforming firms, increasing shared political ties from one standard 
deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean decreases the likelihood of 
CEO exit by 26 percent. Thus, Hypothesis 2.3a is not supported. 
Hypotheses 2.4a, 2.5a, and 2.6a respectively predict that CEO power will reduce 
the positive effect of elite education ties, employment ties, and shared political 
orientations between the TMT and board on CEO turnover. As would be expected, the 
main effect of CEO power is statistically significant and negatively related to CEO 
turnover (-0.14, p<0.001). However, none of the interactions between power and elite 
education ties, employment ties, or shared political orientations are statistically 
significant. Thus, these hypotheses are not supported. 
TMT turnover. Results of models predicting TMT turnover are provided in 
Table 2.3. As with the CEO turnover models, the table provides estimates for the full 
sample of firms (Models 10 to 12), the subsample of underperforming firms (Models 13 
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to 15), and the subsample of superior performing firms (Models 16 to 18). Additionally, 
for each group of firms, I provide results of the control model, the model adding the 
independent variables, and the fully specified model. I also interpret the effect size of 
statistically significant coefficients using the same method of calculating marginal 
effects. 
Hypotheses 2.1b, 2.2b, and 2.3b respectively predict that the strength of the elite 
education ties, employment ties, and shared political orientations between the CEO and 
board will increase the likelihood that one of more members of the TMT exit the firm 
when it is underperforming. The coefficient for elite education tie strength between the 
CEO and the board is positive and statistically significant in Model 15 (0.05, p<0.05). 
This coefficient indicates that moving from one standard deviation below to one 
standard deviation above the mean increases the likelihood of TMT exit by 25 percent. 
Moreover, the corresponding coefficient in Model 18 for superior performing firms is 
not statistically significant. This supports the idea that the effect of elite education ties 
between the CEO and the board on TMT exit is most likely in underperforming firms. 
Thus, these results support Hypothesis 2.1b. 
Unlike for the CEO turnover models, the coefficient for employment tie strength 
between the CEO and board is not statistically significant in the models predicting TMT 
turnover. This is the case for the full sample as well as both subsamples of firms based 
on under- or superior performance. These results thus do not provide support for 
Hypothesis 2.2b. 
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The coefficient for the effect of shared political orientations between the CEO 
and board on TMT exit is positive and statistically significant in Model 15 (0.29, 
p<0.05). This coefficient suggests that, in underperforming firms, moving from one 
standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean of shared political 
orientations between the CEO and the board increases the likelihood of TMT exit by 24 
percent. At the same time, the corresponding effect for this variable in superior 
performing firms is also positive and marginally statistically significant (0.27, p<0.10) 
and indicates that a similar change in this group of firms increases the likelihood of TMT 
exit by 20 percent. Therefore, both the effect size and level of significance support the 
idea that shared political orientations between the CEO and the board would have a 
greater effect on TMT exit in underperforming as compared to superior performing 
firms. Overall, Hypothesis 2.3b is supported. 
Hypotheses 2.4b, 2.5b, and 2.6b respectively predict that TMT power will reduce 
the positive effect of elite education ties, employment ties, and shared political 
orientations between the CEO and board on TMT turnover. Again, consistent with 
expectation, the main effect of TMT power is negative and statistically significant (-
0.13, p<0.001). Like the CEO turnover models, however, none of the interactions are 
statistically significant. Therefore, these hypotheses are not supported. 
Board turnover. Results of models predicting board turnover are provided in 
Table 2.4. I follow the same conventions in organizing these models as for the CEO and 
TMT turnover models. That is, the table provides estimates for the full sample (Models 
19 to 21), underperforming firms (Models 22 to 24), and superior performing firms 
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(Models 25 to 27). I also provide results for models at the three previously used levels of 
specification and interpret effect sizes using marginal effects going from one standard 
deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean of statistically significant 
variables. 
Hypotheses 2.1c, 2.2c, and 2.3c respectively predict that the strength of the elite 
education ties, employment ties, and shared political orientations between the CEO and 
TMT will increase the likelihood that one of more outside directors will exit the firm 
when it is underperforming. Neither the coefficients for elite education tie strength nor 
for employment tie strength between the CEO and the TMT are statistically significant 
in any models predicting board exit. Thus, Hypotheses 2.1c and 2.2c are not supported. 
The coefficient for shared political orientations between the CEO and TMT is 
positive and statistically significant in Model 24 (0.36, p<0.05). This coefficient suggests 
that, in underperforming firms, moving from one standard deviation below to one 
standard deviation above the mean of shared political orientations between the CEO and 
the TMT increases the likelihood of director exit by 22 percent. Further, the 
corresponding coefficient is also positive and marginally statistically significant in the 
subsample of superior performing in Model 27 (0.25, p<0.10). The marginal effect of 
this variable going from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above 
the mean is 15. As with TMT exit, then, these results indicate that shared political 
orientations between the CEO and the board have a stronger effect on director exit in 
underperforming as compared to superior performing firms. Hypothesis 2.3c is thus 
supported. 
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Hypotheses 2.4c, 2.5c, and 2.6c respectively predict that board power will reduce 
the positive effect of elite education ties, employment ties, and shared political 
orientations between the CEO and TMT on director turnover. Interestingly, in this case, 
the main effect of board power is positive and statistically significant in Model 24 (0.10, 
p<0.01), suggesting that greater board power increases the likelihood of director exit in 
underperforming firms. As with the other turnover models, however, none of the 
interactions between board power and CEO to TMT ties are statistically significant. 
These hypotheses are thus not supported. 
3.4.2. Performance Models 
Results of models predicting the change in firm performance following tie-driven 
CEO, TMT, and board turnover are respectively provided in Table 2.5, Table 2.6, and 
Table 2.7. In each case, I provide results including the control variables only and then 
adding the independent variable for the full sample as well as the subsamples of low and 
high performing firms. 
Hypothesis 2.7a predicts that, in underperforming firms, tie-driven CEO turnover 
will lead to more negative subsequent performance. The coefficient for this variable in 
Model 31, the full model for the sample of underperforming firms, is negative and 
statistically significant (-0.04, p<0.05). This suggests that, on average, tie-driven CEO 
turnover leads to an average decrease in ROA of about 4 percent in the year following 
exit. For the average firm in the subsample of underperforming firms, this equates to a 
$1.62 million loss in net income in the year following tie-driven CEO turnover. 
Interestingly, there is also a negative and statistically significant effect in Model 33 for 
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the sample of superior-performing firms (-0.02, p<0.01). This coefficient suggests that 
tie-driven CEO turnover from superior-performing firms leads to an average decreases in 
ROA of about 2 percent in the year following exit. For the average firm in the subsample 
of superior performing firms, this equates to a loss of approximately $12.06 million in 
net income. These results indicate that that practical significance of tie-driven turnover 
actually greater in superior- relative to underperforming firms. Nevertheless, these 
results provide support for Hypothesis 2.7a. 
Hypotheses 2.7b and 2.7c predict that tie-driven TMT and board turnover will, 
respectively, be negatively associated with the subsequent change in performance in 
underperforming firms. Unlike for CEO exit, tie-driven TMT and board turnover is not 
statistically significant in any of the models in Tables 2.6 or 2.7. This is the case for both 
underperforming as well as superior performing firms, suggesting that tie-driven TMT 
and board turnover do not have an effect on the subsequent change in performance. 
Thus, Hypotheses 2.7b and 2.7c are not supported.  
3.5. DISCUSSION 
This study sought to integrate research on power contestation with the social 
networks and social identification literatures to develop and test theory focused on how 
social ties and shared values among the triad of the CEO, TMT, and board influence who 
leaves when the firm is underperforming. As such, this study provides important 
contributions to the power contestation literature as well as research on executive and 
director turnover. In this section, I describe several of these contributions before 
outlining some potential ways in which this study may inform future research. 
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3.5.1. Contributions 
As mentioned previously, there has been a strong focus in the power contestation 
literature on the CEO succession process and particularly on how sociopolitical and 
power dynamics between the CEO and the board influence whether the CEO is 
dismissed and who replaces the CEO when he or she is dismissed (e.g., Cannella & 
Lubatkin, 1993; Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002b, 2002a; Zajac & Westphal, 
1996b). This study therefore extends work on power contestation by considering how 
social psychological and sociopolitical factors among a broader group of top 
organizational members influences turnover outcomes for members beyond the CEO. I 
specifically find that, when the TMT and the board share stronger social ties, this 
increases the likelihood that the CEO will leave the firm. Similarly, when the CEO and 
the board share strong connections through elite education ties or share political 
orientations, members of the TMT are more likely to leave. These results highlight the 
pivotal role of connections to the board in determining outcomes for the CEO and other 
executives. At the same time, I also find that when the CEO and the TMT have greater 
shared political orientations, this increases the likelihood of board turnover. As such, I 
contribute to research on power contestation by not only demonstrating that social ties 
and shared values affect turnover outcomes for top organizational members, but also by 
developing a better understanding regarding which ties are most critical in determining 
the outcome of power contests. 
In addition, I contribute to the power contestation literature by expanding our 
understanding of the performance implications of intra-organizational contests for 
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power. Although research in this area has examined how successor type influences 
subsequent firm performance (see Finkelstein et al., 2009), it has largely overlooked the 
question of whether there are different performance implications based on who leaves 
the firm when it is underperforming. My findings suggest that, when CEO turnover is 
driven by strong ties between the TMT and the board, this may prevent turnaround and 
lead to worsening performance. As such, I not only confirm past research that suggests 
CEO turnover in underperforming firms may often be more symbolic than substantive 
(Gangloff et al., 2016; Kesner & Dalton, 1994; Khanna & Poulsen, 1995; Pfeffer, 1981a; 
Rowe et al., 2005), but also provide evidence that scapegoating is detrimental to firm 
performance. Thus, my findings challenge the notion that CEO turnover is necessary to 
effectively turn around poorly performing organizations (e.g., Arogyaswamy et al., 
1995; Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Bibeault, 1982) and contribute to research on turnover 
in underperforming firms by clarifying that, when driven by social or sociopolitical 
dynamics, turnover can actually inhibit rather than facilitate recovery. 
At the same time, my findings suggest that the effects of tie-driven CEO turnover 
are not unique to underperforming firms. Although the ties I examine appear to have 
stronger effects in the subsample of underperforming firms, many of them also do 
influence turnover in superior-performing firms. Results also indicate that when the 
CEO leaves and the TMT and board share stronger ties, this may lead to an even more 
significant dip in firm performance for superior-performing firms as compared to 
underperforming firms. In this way, I contribute back to the more general literatures on 
executive and director turnover by demonstrating how social ties and shared values 
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affect turnover outcomes for these organizational members as well as subsequent firm 
performance. Also, since I find these effects after controlling for various measures of 
demographic and experience diversity used in past work, I also contribute to the general 
turnover literature by identifying factors at the top of the organization that may be more 
reflective of deep-level diversity (Harrison et al., 1998). 
3.5.2. Future Research 
The findings of this study also point to a number of potentially fruitful areas for 
future research. In particular, the finding that stronger shared political orientations 
between the TMT and the board decrease the likelihood of CEO turnover runs contrary 
to expectation and may inspire further inquiry. Future work could build on this finding to 
explore the boundary conditions of the relationships I examine and clarify when 
diversity along certain social or value-based dimensions may have different effects. For 
instance, past work suggests that boards have a tendency to dismiss demographically 
dissimilar CEOs in order to replace them with more similar individuals (Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996b). So what is it about political affiliations that might cause differences in 
a CEO’s political orientations to mitigate rather than increase the likelihood of turnover? 
Do boards recognize that an incumbent CEO with contrasting views to other TMT 
members may be in a better position to improve the firm’s performance, even if those 
views also differ from the dominant position of the board? Or could it be that, when 
CEOs are more different along the value-dimension, this reflects that their appointment 
was intentionally based on those differences such that they provide a buffer from 
dismissal? Examining questions such as this for political orientation or other value-based 
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factors (e.g., religion), may help future work further distinguish between various deep-
level characteristics. 
Future research may extend the findings from this study by taking the 
relationships I examine to the individual level. Although taking a firm or group-level 
approach allows for me to focus on the creation of factions or coalitions at the top of the 
firm, this does reduce some of the nuance that may be gained by looking at turnover at 
the individual level. In particular, while the effect of social ties and shared values 
between any two members of the CEO-TMT-board triad would presumably lead to 
turnover of the most dissimilar members of the opposing group, I do not directly 
examine this proposition. Additional research at the individual level may therefore help 
to determine whether the least connected individuals are truly the ones who leave when 
the firm is underperforming. Similarly, although my results support the theoretical 
argument that tie-driven exit reflects scapegoating, the nature of my data limits my 
ability to directly explore the reason for turnover. Follow-up studies may be able to get 
better at this by taking a qualitative approach and directly examining attributions of 
blame in formal firm communications to external constituents via press releases or 
conference calls with equity analysts. In either case, future work may be able to better 
answer the question: are the least connected individuals the most likely to be blamed for 
poor performance? 
Finally, scholars may build on this study by integrating alternative theories into 
the examination of turnover among top organizational members. Future work may 
specifically incorporate resource dependence theory to better understand some of the 
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boundary conditions of tie-driven turnover and subsequent performance. For example, 
how do superior external connections (e.g., through board interlocks) moderate the 
relationships between internal connections and turnover? Are those with better ties to 
external resources less likely to be dismissed, even when they have fewer internal 
connections? Or are such individuals more likely to use those external links to find 
alternative employment? Also, what are the performance consequences of turnover for 
those with stronger external networks? Similarly, further incorporating a psychological 
perspective may offer new insights into the kinds of factors that affecting group 
composition and dynamics at the top of the organization. For example, how is 
personality reflected in the composition of the TMT? The board? Do boards select 
CEO’s for particular situations based on personality? Or how does personality diversity 
affect individual or organizational outcomes such as turnover and performance? Clearly, 
many questions remain unanswered in the literature on team composition and turnover at 
the top of the firm. Expanding on the findings of this study may provide a useful origin 
for addressing many of those questions. 
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this dissertation was to explore how employment ties, education ties, 
and shared political orientations, as a reflection of deep-level similarities and 
differences, influences turnover among CEOs, TMTs, and boards of underperforming 
firms. Using a sample of executives and directors of S&P 1500 firms, the dissertation 
provided a set of analyses at different levels of analysis demonstrating the relevance of 
these factors in determining patterns of turnover among these organizational members. 
At the individual level, the first study found that employment ties and ties to the CEO 
were particularly influential in determining whether a given executive left the firm. Also, 
while these effects were manifest in poor performing firms, results indicated that social 
ties and shared values between individual executives and the CEO or the rest of the team 
had an even stronger influence on their likelihood of leaving superior performing firms. 
The second study took a group-level approach and demonstrated the prominent 
role of shared political orientations among the triad of the CEO, TMT, and board in 
influencing which of these members left the firm when it was underperforming. It also 
demonstrated that, for executives, ties to the board were particularly important in 
determining whether the CEO or members of the TMT were pushed out of 
underperforming firms. Moreover, it found that, while tie-driven TMT turnover and 
board turnover did not affect subsequent performance, tie-driven CEO turnover was 
detrimental to both underperforming and superior-performing firms. 
The dissertation therefore confirms past work indicating that both CEOs and 
boards play a prominent role in the circulation of power among the dominant coalition of 
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the firm. It also provides a number of new insights to theory and research on executive 
and director turnover, especially regarding the factors that are most likely to influence 
the social and sociopolitical dynamics at the top of the firm. As such, it opens various 
new avenues for future research to better understand the processes governing the 
corporate elite and how these processes are likely to influence the firms they manage. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 1) 
# Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Executive turnover 0.24 0.43 
2 Education tie strength (CEO) -0.01 1.68 -0.02 
3 Employment tie strength (CEO) -0.11 1.87 -0.05 0.04 
4 Shared political orientations (CEO) 0.28 0.45 -0.06 0.02 0.08 
5 Education tie strength (TMT) -0.01 1.67 -0.02 0.12 0.04 0.03 
6 Employment tie strength (TMT) -0.14 1.85 -0.05 0.03 0.64 0.09 0.05 
7 Shared political orientations (TMT) 0.44 0.50 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.36 0.01 0.04 
8 TMT pay gap 4308.12 9774.44 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
9 CEO pay gap -6.79 2938.64 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.24 
10 CEO exit 0.12 0.32 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 
11 TMT exit 0.24 0.25 0.11 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.14 
12 Age 51.59 7.46 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 
13 Female 0.08 0.27 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 
14 TMT age diversity 0.12 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.05 0.02 
15 TMT gender diversity 0.10 0.16 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.08 
16 TMT ethnic diversity 0.05 0.12 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.03 
17 TMT education level diversity 0.43 0.17 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.03 0.03 
18 TMT firm tenure diversity 0.73 0.34 0.10 -0.01 -0.13 -0.05 -0.03 -0.12 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.17 
19 TMT industry tenure diversity 0.50 0.20 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.10 
20 TMT industry experience diversity 0.38 0.14 0.02 -0.03 -0.13 -0.02 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 
21 Log of employees 2.26 1.30 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.12 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.05 0.07 
22 Material restatements 0.07 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04 
23 Lawsuits against firm 0.30 0.46 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.08 
24 Industry concentration ratio 0.12 0.13 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 -0.02 -0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
25 Industry dynamism 0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 
26 Industry munificence 0.04 0.12 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
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Table 1.1. (Continued) 
# Variable 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
13 Female -0.08 
14 TMT age diversity -0.10 -0.02 
15 TMT gender diversity -0.05 0.48 -0.04 
16 TMT ethnic diversity -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.06 
17 TMT education level diversity -0.01 -0.01 0.10 -0.03 -0.07 
18 TMT firm tenure diversity -0.06 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.08 
19 TMT industry tenure diversity 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.43 
20 TMT industry experience diversity 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.03 
21 Log of employees 0.11 0.02 -0.17 0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.11 
22 Material restatements -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.01 
23 Lawsuits against firm 0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.03 0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.29 0.02 
24 Industry concentration ratio 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.11 -0.01 0.02 
25 Industry dynamism -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.28 
26 Industry munificence -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.15 -0.28 
108 
Table 1.2. Results of Random Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Executive Turnover 
Full Sample (N = 62,260) Low Performers (N = 27,983) High Performers (N = 34,277) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Education tie strength (CEO) -0.07 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.20 -0.20* 
(0.67) (0.85) (0.03) (0.03) (0.74) (0.08) 
Employment tie strength (CEO) -0.25 -0.25 -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.25 -0.25** 
(3.06) (3.84) (0.03) (0.03) (0.81) (0.08) 
Political tie strength (CEO) -1.25 -1.25 -0.76*** -0.76*** -1.28 -1.29*** 
(13.21) (16.59) (0.11) (0.11) (4.08) (0.29) 
Education tie strength (TMT) -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.09 -0.09 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.35) (0.10) 
Employment tie strength (TMT) -0.21 -0.21 -0.09** -0.09** -0.21 -0.21* 
(3.02) (3.77) (0.03) (0.03) (0.86) (0.09) 
Political tie strength (TMT) -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 
(0.36) (0.43) (0.07) (0.07) (0.26) (0.19) 
CEO pay gap -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TMT pay gap -0.00 -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00* -0.00 -0.00* 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education tie strength x pay gap 
(CEO) 
-0.00 0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Employment tie strength x pay gap 
(CEO) 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Political tie strength x pay gap 
(CEO) 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education tie strength x pay gap 
(TMT) 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Employment tie strength x pay gap 
(TMT) 
0.00 0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Political tie strength x pay gap 
(TMT) 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Table 1.2. (Continued) 
Full Sample (N = 62,260) Low Performers (N = 27,983) High Performers (N = 34,277) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CEO exit 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.38** 0.36 0.36+ 
(0.26) (1.28) (1.61) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.36) (0.20) 
TMT exit 1.03 1.04 1.03 1.36*** 1.31*** 1.31*** 0.75** 0.77 0.77* 
(3.51) (8.72) (10.86) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.24) (1.98) (0.32) 
Age 1.44 1.42 1.42 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.90*** 1.16 1.16*** 
(6.32) (17.37) (21.81) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.25) (4.06) (0.02) 
Female 5.17 3.09 3.08 0.32+ 0.31 0.31 2.75** 3.42 3.44*** 
(23.46) (38.41) (48.02) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.87) (12.32) (0.40) 
TMT age diversity -2.62 -0.34 -0.30 -1.15+ -1.33 -1.32 -0.56 0.51 0.58 
(7.31) (14.77) (19.25) (0.68) (0.88) (0.88) (2.13) (7.91) (3.11) 
TMT gender diversity 2.59 2.53 2.52 1.71*** 1.71*** 1.71*** 2.35** 2.49 2.49** 
(9.43) (26.11) (32.74) (0.24) (0.33) (0.33) (0.75) (7.76) (0.85) 
TMT ethnic diversity 1.68 1.68 1.67 0.69* 0.52 0.52 2.10* 2.16 2.15* 
(6.47) (18.52) (22.94) (0.28) (0.37) (0.37) (0.87) (7.29) (1.06) 
TMT education level diversity -0.36 -0.25 -0.26 -0.42* -0.45+ -0.44+ 0.21 0.31 0.30 
(1.83) (3.81) (4.76) (0.20) (0.24) (0.24) (0.55) (1.19) (0.80) 
TMT firm tenure diversity -0.34 -0.35 -0.35 -0.10 -0.20* -0.20* -0.24 -0.30 -0.30 
(2.55) (7.50) (9.41) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.25) (2.70) (0.34) 
TMT industry tenure diversity 0.86 0.70 0.69 0.92*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 1.15* 1.01 1.00 
(3.18) (6.71) (8.20) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.55) (4.10) (0.71) 
TMT industry experience diversity -1.16 -1.35 -1.34 -0.15 -0.40 -0.40 -1.45* -1.94 -1.94* 
(6.11) (19.18) (23.95) (0.24) (0.30) (0.30) (0.73) (6.39) (0.94) 
Log of employees -0.02 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09** -0.05 -0.05 0.26+ 0.28 0.28+ 
(0.36) (2.25) (2.78) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.80) (0.15) 
Material restatements 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.35+ 0.37 0.38 
(0.92) (2.53) (3.16) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.20) (0.72) (0.26) 
Lawsuits against firm 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.22* 0.24 0.24+ 
(0.38) (0.97) (1.23) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.42) (0.14) 
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Table 1.2. (Continued) 
Full Sample (N = 62,260) Low Performers (N = 27,983) High Performers (N = 34,277) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Industry concentration ratio 1.90 1.57 1.57 1.28*** 0.97** 0.98** -0.45 -0.83 -0.82 
(8.65) (20.86) (26.14) (0.29) (0.37) (0.37) (0.78) (3.03) (1.05) 
Industry dynamism 0.36 0.28 0.29 -0.68 -0.57 -0.58 0.20 0.41 0.46 
(2.85) (3.12) (3.15) (0.74) (0.83) (0.84) (1.98) (3.70) (2.75) 
Industry munificence -0.82 -0.82 -0.83 -0.78** -0.86* -0.86* -0.31 -0.27 -0.29 
(5.16) (14.95) (19.00) (0.24) (0.43) (0.43) (0.52) (1.63) (0.75) 
Constant -79.56 -79.25 -79.28 -13.77*** -13.83*** -13.83*** -52.36*** -67.77 -67.74 
(341.67) (946.21) (1,187.99) (0.66) (1.48) (1.48) (14.16) (230.46) (0.00) 
Observations 62,260 62,260 62,260 27,983 27,983 27,983 34,277 34,277 34,277 
Log likelihood -27184 -27142 -27141 -14028 -13941 -13939 -15770 -15631 -15628 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on firm). 
+ p < 0.1 
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01 
*** p < 0.001. All tests two-tailed. 
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Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 2) 
# Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 CEO exit 0.11 0.31 
2 TMT exit 0.63 0.48 0.11 
3 Board exit 0.61 0.49 0.11 0.19 
4 Performance change -0.00 0.14 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 
5 Elite education tie strength 
(CEO to TMT) 
0.78 2.24 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 
6 Elite education tie strength 
(CEO to board) 
1.06 2.38 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.00 0.42 
7 Elite education tie strength 
(TMT to board) 
1.35 2.35 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.40 0.26 
8 Employment tie strength 
(CEO to TMT) 
1.31 1.81 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.03 
9 Employment tie strength 
(CEO to board) 
1.02 1.86 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.21 
10 Employment tie strength 
(TMT to board) 
1.36 1.87 0.05 0.07 0.05 -0.00 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.20 0.42 
11 Shared political orientations 
(CEO to TMT) 
0.35 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
12 Shared political orientations 
(CEO to board) 
0.47 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.13 
13 Shared political orientations 
(TMT to board) 
0.28 0.21 -0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.58 
14 Education tie strength (CEO 
to TMT) 
0.50 1.66 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.41 0.09 0.10 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
15 Education tie strength (CEO 
to board) 
0.63 1.69 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.15 0.60 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.20 
16 Education tie strength (TMT 
to board) 
0.86 1.58 0.01 0.07 0.03 -0.00 0.16 0.09 0.56 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.17 
17 Tie-driven CEO exit 0.05 0.21 0.64 0.08 0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.01 
18 Tie-driven TMT exit 0.15 0.36 0.06 0.32 0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.24 0.00 0.09 0.32 0.14 0.06 0.22 0.09 -0.03 
19 Tie-driven board exit 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.03 0.30 -0.01 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.40 0.08 0.08 0.28 0.05 0.05 0.05 
20 CEO power -0.08 2.99 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.04 
21 TMT power -0.03 1.42 -0.01 -0.07 0.06 -0.00 0.10 0.06 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.01 
22 Board power 0.02 0.99 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.00 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.02 0.05 0.09 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 
23 CEO age 55.90 7.23 0.13 -0.07 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.04 
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Table 2.1. (Continued) 
# Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
24 CEO is female 0.02 0.15 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
25 CEO tenure 15.59 11.11 -0.02 -0.12 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.05 -0.21 -0.15 -0.20 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06 
26 Board independence 
ratio 
0.83 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.15 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.03 -0.02 0.09 -0.03 
27 TMT age diversity 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
28 TMT gender diversity 0.10 0.16 0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
29 TMT ethnic diversity 0.06 0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
30 TMT education level 
diversity 
0.43 0.18 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.00 -0.14 -0.08 -0.16 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.05 
31 TMT company tenure 
diversity 
0.70 0.33 0.09 0.20 0.10 -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.17 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 
32 TMT industry tenure 
diversity 
0.49 0.20 0.04 0.07 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.04 
33 TMT industry 
experience diversity 
0.38 0.15 0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.17 -0.04 -0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 
34 Board age diversity 0.12 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 
35 Board gender diversity 0.22 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.08 -0.00 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 
36 Board ethnic diversity 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.01 
37 Board education level 
diversity 
0.45 0.16 0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.00 -0.10 -0.15 -0.22 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 -0.01 
38 Board tenure diversity 0.70 0.27 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.19 -0.11 -0.11 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 
39 Board industry tenure 
diversity 
1.56 0.66 0.03 0.04 0.08 -0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.06 -0.08 -0.11 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.02 
40 Board industry 
experience diversity 
0.44 0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 
41 Log of employees 2.21 1.29 0.05 0.09 0.11 -0.00 0.07 0.05 0.13 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.08 -0.03 
42 Material restatements 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
43 Lawsuits against firm 0.29 0.45 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
44 Industry concentration 
ratio 
0.12 0.13 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.04 -0.03 
45 Industry dynamism 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
46 Industry munificence 0.04 0.12 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 
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Table 2.1. (Continued) 
# Variable 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
16 
Education tie strength (TMT to 
board) 
0.19 
17 Tie-driven CEO exit (TMT to board) 0.01 0.04 
18 Tie-driven TMT exit (CEO to board) 0.13 0.01 0.04 
19 Tie-driven board exit (CEO to TMT) -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.07 
20 CEO power 0.05 -0.04 -0.07 0.03 0.08 
21 TMT power 0.00 0.11 0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.05 
22 Board power 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.55 
23 CEO age 0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.20 -0.10 -0.13 
24 CEO is female -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 
25 CEO tenure 0.10 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 0.15 -0.10 -0.13 0.37 -0.06 
26 Board independence ratio -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.23 0.06 0.14 -0.05 0.04 -0.22 
27 TMT age diversity 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.17 -0.05 -0.10 0.20 -0.04 0.10 -0.28 
28 TMT gender diversity -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.30 -0.06 0.06 -0.04 
29 TMT ethnic diversity 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.05 
30 TMT education level diversity -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 -0.23 -0.13 0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.09 -0.02 -0.06 
31 TMT company tenure diversity 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.18 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.00 
32 TMT industry tenure diversity 0.00 0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.02 -0.01 
33 TMT industry experience diversity 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
34 Board age diversity 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.13 -0.04 -0.02 -0.08 0.00 0.02 -0.17 0.13 -0.02 0.00 
35 Board gender diversity -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.23 -0.17 0.13 0.01 
36 Board ethnic diversity -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.20 -0.15 0.05 0.10 
37 Board education level diversity -0.04 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.07 -0.13 -0.28 0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.08 -0.03 -0.04 
38 Board tenure diversity 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
39 Board industry tenure diversity -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.13 0.03 -0.04 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.11 -0.06 0.02 0.01 
40 Board industry experience diversity 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 
41 Log of employees -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.17 -0.16 0.05 0.08 
42 Material restatements -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
43 Lawsuits against firm -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.10 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.08 -0.08 0.03 0.06 
44 Industry concentration ratio -0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.05 
45 Industry dynamism 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 
46 Industry munificence -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
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Table 2.1. (Continued) 
# Variable 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 
31 
TMT company tenure 
diversity 
0.08 
32 
TMT industry tenure 
diversity 
0.04 0.43 
33 
TMT industry experience 
diversity 
0.06 0.09 0.05 
34 Board age diversity 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 
35 Board gender diversity -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.08 
36 Board ethnic diversity -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.08 0.27 
37 
Board education level 
diversity 
0.13 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.08 -0.02 -0.12 
38 Board tenure diversity 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.06 
39 
Board industry tenure 
diversity 
-0.04 0.03 0.09 0.06 -0.07 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.02 
40 
Board industry experience 
diversity 
-0.01 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.12 0.03 0.10 
41 Log of employees 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.12 -0.09 0.34 0.32 -0.04 0.06 0.18 -0.02 
42 Material restatements 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
43 Lawsuits against firm -0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.12 0.13 -0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.28 0.02 
44 Industry concentration ratio 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.02 
45 Industry dynamism 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.28 
46 Industry munificence -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.14 -0.31 
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Table 2.2. Results of Random Effects Logistic Regression Predicting CEO Exit 
Full Sample (N=13,294) Low Performers (N=6,071) High Performers (N=7,223) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Elite education tie strength (TMT to board) 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04 0.05+ 0.02 0.03 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Employment tie strength (TMT to board) 0.08*** 0.07** 0.06* 0.06+ 0.10** 0.09* 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Shared political orientations (TMT to 
board) -0.58* -0.62* -0.72* -0.74* -0.41 -0.44 
(0.23) (0.25) (0.30) (0.32) (0.35) (0.36) 
Elite education tie strength (CEO to TMT) 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Employment tie strength (CEO to TMT) -0.08** -0.08** -0.06* -0.06* -0.11** -0.11** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Shared political orientations (CEO to 
TMT) 0.23 0.23 -0.02 -0.03 0.42+ 0.43+ 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
Elite education tie strength (CEO to board) 0.04+ 0.03+ 0.05* 0.05* 0.00 0.00 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Employment tie strength (CEO to board) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Shared political orientations (CEO to 
board) 0.22 0.21 0.38* 0.37* -0.06 -0.07 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.19) (0.25) (0.25) 
Elite education tie strength (TMT to board) 
x CEO power 
0.01 0.00 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Employment tie strength (TMT to board) x 
CEO power 
-0.01+ -0.01 -0.02 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Shared political orientations (TMT to 
board) x CEO power 
-0.05 -0.04 -0.06 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) 
Education tie strength (TMT to board) 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
CEO power -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
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Full Sample (N=13,294) Low Performers (N=6,071) High Performers (N=7,223) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
TMT exit 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Board exit 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
CEO age 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CEO is female -0.46 -0.50 -0.50 -0.09 -0.13 -0.15 -0.89+ -0.93+ -0.92+ 
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.50) (0.51) (0.51) 
CEO tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.02* -0.02* 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Board independence ratio -0.37 -0.34 -0.37 0.63 0.80 0.79 -0.89 -0.97 -1.03 
(0.52) (0.53) (0.54) (0.74) (0.76) (0.76) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) 
Log of employees 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.09* 0.09* 0.09* 0.11* 0.12* 0.12* 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Material restatements 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 0.31* 0.31* 0.31* 0.26 0.26 0.25 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Lawsuits against firm 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Industry concentration ratio -0.28 -0.35 -0.37 -0.11 -0.17 -0.19 -0.10 -0.18 -0.20 
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.45) (0.46) (0.46) 
Industry dynamism -0.51 -0.39 -0.40 -1.78 -1.67 -1.67 0.45 0.54 0.53 
(1.01) (1.00) (1.01) (1.32) (1.33) (1.34) (1.40) (1.39) (1.40) 
Industry munificence -0.40 -0.44 -0.44 -0.19 -0.27 -0.27 -0.73 -0.76 -0.74 
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45) (0.49) (0.51) (0.50) 
Constant -9.27*** -9.44*** -9.42*** -8.94*** -9.02*** -9.01*** -9.05*** -9.15*** -9.13*** 
(0.68) (0.70) (0.70) (0.94) (0.94) (0.95) (0.87) (0.90) (0.90) 
Table 2.2. (Continued)
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Table 2.2. (Continued) 
Full Sample (N=13,294) Low Performers (N=6,071) High Performers (N=7,223) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Log likelihood -4101 -4075 -4072 -2009 -1993 -1992 -2098 -2086 -2083 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on firm). 
+ p < 0.1 
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01 
*** p < 0.001. All tests two-tailed. 
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Table 2.3. Results of Random Effects Logistic Regression Predicting TMT Exit 
Full Sample (N=13,294) Low Performers (N=6,071) High Performers (N=7,223) 
Variables Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Elite education tie strength 
(CEO to board) 
0.03+ 0.03+ 0.05* 0.05* 0.01 0.01 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Employment tie strength 
(CEO to board) 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Shared political orientations 
(CEO to board) 
0.28** 0.28** 0.28+ 0.29* 0.27+ 0.27+ 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Elite education tie strength 
(CEO to TMT) 
0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Employment tie strength 
(CEO to TMT) 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Shared political orientations 
(CEO to TMT) 
0.08 0.08 0.26+ 0.26+ -0.07 -0.07 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Elite education tie strength 
(TMT to board) 
0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Employment tie strength 
(TMT to board) 
0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Shared political orientations 
(TMT to board) 
-0.78*** -0.78*** -0.69** -0.66** -0.85*** -0.87*** 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) 
Elite education tie strength 
(CEO to board) x TMT 
power 
-0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Employment tie strength 
(CEO to board) x TMT 
power 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Shared political orientations 
(CEO to board) x TMT 
power 
-0.00 -0.05 0.05 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
Education tie strength (CEO 
to board) 
-0.03+ -0.05** -0.05** -0.03 -0.06** -0.06** -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
TMT power -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
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Table 2.3. (Continued) 
Full Sample (N=13,294) Low Performers (N=6,071) High Performers (N=7,223) 
Variables Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
CEO exit 0.71*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Board exit 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
TMT age diversity 2.04*** 1.92*** 1.92*** 2.12** 1.86* 1.86* 1.74* 1.76* 1.76* 
(0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.76) (0.75) (0.75) (0.71) (0.71) (0.71) 
TMT gender diversity 0.62*** 0.58** 0.58** 0.44+ 0.41+ 0.41 0.65** 0.62** 0.63** 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) 
TMT ethnic diversity 0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.20 -0.20 0.21 0.05 0.04 
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) 
TMT education level 
diversity 
0.43** 0.56** 0.54** 0.22 0.33 0.32 0.55* 0.70** 0.68** 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
TMT company tenure 
diversity 
1.22*** 1.17*** 1.17*** 1.35*** 1.30*** 1.30*** 1.16*** 1.12*** 1.12*** 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
TMT industry tenure 
diversity 
-0.17 -0.19 -0.19 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.27 -0.29 -0.30 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
TMT industry experience 
diversity 
0.48* 0.56** 0.55** 0.59* 0.66* 0.66* 0.39 0.49+ 0.48+ 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Log of employees 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Material restatements -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 -0.08 -0.11 -0.11 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Lawsuits against firm 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.18** 0.15* 0.15* 0.26*** 0.23** 0.23** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Industry concentration 
ratio 
-0.44* -0.34+ -0.34+ -0.55+ -0.47 -0.47 -0.27 -0.12 -0.12 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) 
Industry dynamism 0.59 0.55 0.58 -0.04 -0.15 -0.11 1.24 1.21 1.26 
(0.71) (0.72) (0.71) (0.97) (0.96) (0.96) (0.92) (0.95) (0.95) 
Industry munificence -0.35 -0.42* -0.42+ -0.30 -0.39 -0.39 -0.42 -0.51+ -0.48+ 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
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Table 2.3. (Continued) 
Full Sample (N=13,294) Low Performers (N=6,071) High Performers (N=7,223) 
Variables Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Constant -1.39*** -1.57*** -1.57*** -1.41*** -1.63*** -1.64*** -1.33*** -1.52*** -1.50*** 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) 
Log likelihood -8137 -8060 -8058 -3681 -3642 -3641 -4457 -4412 -4409 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on firm). 
+ p < 0.1 
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01 
*** p < 0.001. All tests two-tailed. 
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Table 2.4. Results of Random Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Board Exit 
Full Sample (N=13,294) Low Performers (N=6,071) High Performers (N=7,223) 
Variables Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 
Elite education tie strength 
(CEO to TMT) 
-0.02+ -0.02+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Employment tie strength (CEO 
to TMT) 
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Shared political orientations 
(CEO to TMT) 
0.31** 0.31** 0.36* 0.36* 0.25+ 0.25+ 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) 
Elite education tie strength 
(CEO to board) 
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Employment tie strength (CEO 
to board) 
0.05** 0.05** 0.03 0.03 0.06** 0.06** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Shared political orientations 
(CEO to board) 
-0.15 -0.15 -0.16 -0.17 -0.12 -0.12 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) 
Elite education tie strength 
(TMT to board) 
0.03* 0.03* 0.02 0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Employment tie strength (TMT 
to board) 
0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Shared political orientations 
(TMT to board) 
0.44** 0.44** 0.57* 0.58* 0.32 0.32 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.21) 
Elite education tie strength 
(CEO to TMT) x board 
power 
0.00 -0.00 0.01 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Employment tie strength (CEO 
to TMT) x board power 
0.01 0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Shared political orientations 
(CEO to TMT) x board 
power 
0.07 0.14 0.03 
(0.10) (0.15) (0.13) 
Education tie strength (CEO to 
TMT) 
-0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.04+ -0.02 -0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Board power 0.08** 0.07* 0.07* 0.12** 0.10* 0.10** 0.06 0.04 0.04 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
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Table 2.4. (Continued) 
Full Sample (N=13,294) Low Performers (N=6,071) High Performers (N=7,223) 
Variables Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 
CEO exit 0.63*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.87*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.48** 0.44** 0.44** 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
TMT exit 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Board age diversity 4.98*** 4.93*** 4.92*** 4.93*** 4.87*** 4.85*** 4.28*** 4.31*** 4.30*** 
(0.66) (0.67) (0.67) (0.88) (0.90) (0.90) (0.84) (0.85) (0.85) 
Board gender 
diversity 
0.13 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.25 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Board ethnic diversity -0.42* -0.50* -0.51* -0.57+ -0.67* -0.66* -0.18 -0.29 -0.29 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Board education level 
diversity 
1.14*** 1.16*** 1.15*** 1.22*** 1.21*** 1.21*** 1.03*** 1.08*** 1.07*** 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) 
Board tenure diversity 0.41*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.41** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
Board industry tenure 
diversity 
0.22*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Board industry 
experience 
diversity 
0.43+ 0.48* 0.48* 0.56+ 0.58+ 0.58+ 0.29 0.35 0.35 
(0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) 
Log of employees 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Material restatements 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Lawsuits against firm 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.24** 0.24** 0.19** 0.18** 0.18** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Industry concentration 
ratio 
-0.38+ -0.36 -0.36+ -0.30 -0.23 -0.23 -0.47+ -0.48+ -0.49+ 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Industry dynamism 1.47* 1.44* 1.44* 1.73+ 1.68+ 1.68+ 1.15 1.17 1.17 
(0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.91) (0.91) (0.91) (0.90) (0.89) (0.90) 
Industry munificence -0.19 -0.21 -0.20 -0.10 -0.14 -0.14 -0.19 -0.20 -0.20 
(0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
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Table 2.4. (Continued) 
Full Sample (N=13,294) Low Performers (N=6,071) High Performers (N=7,223) 
Variables Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 
Constant -2.08*** -2.49*** -2.49*** -2.12*** -2.55*** -2.54*** -1.98*** -2.36*** -2.36*** 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) 
Log likelihood -8356 -8313 -8313 -3722 -3702 -3702 -4634 -4611 -4611 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on firm). 
+ p < 0.1 
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01 
*** p < 0.001. All tests two-tailed. 
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Table 2.5. Results of Random Effects Regression Predicting Firm Performance Following Forced CEO Exit 
Full Sample (N=7,612) Low Performers (N=3,630) High Performers (N=3,982) 
Variables Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 
Tie-driven CEO exit -0.03** -0.04* -0.02** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
CEO power 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TMT exit -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Board exit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO is female 0.00+ 0.00* 0.00 0.00+ 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO tenure 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.02* 0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Board independence ratio -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of employees 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
Material restatements -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Lawsuits against firm 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry concentration ratio 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02+ -0.00 -0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry dynamism 0.01+ 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry munificence 0.03 0.02 0.14** 0.13* -0.09+ -0.09+ 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
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Table 2.5. (Continued) 
Full Sample (N=7,612) Low Performers (N=3,630) High Performers (N=3,982) 
Variables Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 
Constant -0.06* -0.06* -0.07 -0.08 -0.04* -0.05* 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on firm). 
+ p < 0.1 
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01 
*** p < 0.001. All tests two-tailed. 
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Table 2.6. Results of Random Effects Regression Predicting Firm Performance Following Forced TMT Exit 
Full Sample (N=12,677) Low Performers (N=5,785) High Performers (N=6,892) 
Variables Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 Model 39 
Tie-driven TMT exit -0.00 -0.01 0.00 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
TMT power 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO exit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Board exit 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
TMT age diversity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TMT gender diversity 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
TMT ethnic diversity -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
TMT education level diversity 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
TMT company tenure diversity -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
TMT industry tenure diversity 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
TMT industry experience diversity -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02+ -0.02+ 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Log of employees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Material restatements -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00** 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Lawsuits against firm 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry concentration ratio 0.01+ 0.01+ 0.02* 0.02* -0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry dynamism 0.01+ 0.01+ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
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Table 2.6. (Continued) 
Full Sample (N=12,677) Low Performers (N=5,785) High Performers (N=6,892) 
Variables Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 Model 39 
Industry munificence -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on firm). 
+ p < 0.1 
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01 
*** p < 0.001. All tests two-tailed. 
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Table 2.7. Results of Random Effects Regression Predicting Firm Performance Following Forced Board Exit 
Full Sample (N=12,652) Low Performers (N=5,792) High Performers (N=6,860) 
Variables Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 Model 43 Model 44 Model 45 
Tie-driven board exit -0.00 -0.01 0.00 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Board power -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO exit -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TMT exit 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Board age diversity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Board gender diversity 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06+ 0.06+ 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Board ethnic diversity -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Board education level diversity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Board tenure diversity -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Board industry tenure diversity 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
Board industry experience diversity 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01* 0.01* 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of employees -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Material restatements -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Lawsuits against firm 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry concentration ratio 0.01+ 0.01+ 0.02* 0.02* -0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry dynamism 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
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Table 2.7. (Continued) 
Full Sample (N=12,652) Low Performers (N=5,792) High Performers (N=6,860) 
Variables Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 Model 43 Model 44 Model 45 
Industry munificence -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03** -0.03** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on firm). 
+ p < 0.1 
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01 
*** p < 0.001. All tests two-tailed. 
